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Issues Involved:
1. Whether the acquisition proceedings were mala fide and in fraud of the Act. 2. Whether the Society was entitled to an injunction against the Government taking possession of the land. 3. Whether the Government's satisfaction must be stated in the notification itself under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. Detailed Analysis: 1. Mala Fides and Fraud of the Act: The Trial Court found that the 1st respondent Society failed to establish allegations of mala fides and abuse of power under the Land Acquisition Act, leading to the dismissal of the suit. The Additional District Judge, upon appeal, also found no evidence of mala fides or misuse of power by the Government. The High Court concurred, noting no evidence of collusion between Swaika and the Education Department or the Land Acquisition Department officers. The High Court observed that "prima facie, there is no reason to differ from the findings made by the courts below." The Supreme Court emphasized that the question of mala fides is a factual matter. With concurrent findings by the Trial Court and the District Court against the 1st respondent Society, the High Court could not reopen this finding unless it was perverse or unreasonable, which was not argued. Therefore, the allegation of mala fides or abuse of power by the Government was conclusively negated, and the 1st respondent Society could not canvass this question before the Supreme Court. 2. Injunction Against Government Taking Possession: The 1st respondent Society sought an injunction against the Government taking possession of the land, claiming the acquisition proceedings were invalid. The Trial Court dismissed the suit, and the Additional District Judge upheld this decision, finding no grounds for an injunction. The High Court also did not find sufficient evidence to support the claim of mala fides or fraud, thus not justifying an injunction. 3. Government's Satisfaction in Notification Under Section 6: The High Court held that the notification under section 6 must explicitly state the Government's satisfaction that the land is needed for a public purpose. The High Court was influenced by the change in wording from "when it appears to the Local Government" to "when the Local Government is satisfied" after the amendment by Act 38 of 1923. The High Court concluded that the notification using "it appears to the Governor" instead of "the Governor is satisfied" did not show such satisfaction and thus was not in proper form. The Supreme Court, however, disagreed with this interpretation. It held that satisfaction of the Government is a condition precedent for a valid declaration under section 6, but the section does not require this satisfaction to be stated in the declaration. The declaration must state that the land is needed for a public purpose, which becomes conclusive evidence once published. The Supreme Court referenced the case of Ezra v. The Secretary of State, affirming that a notification under section 6 need not be in any particular form. The Supreme Court further noted that even if satisfaction were stated in the notification, it could still be challenged factually. In this case, no issue was raised regarding the Government's actual satisfaction, and no evidence was led to prove otherwise. The procedural steps taken, including the inquiry under section 5A and the recommendations of the Additional Collector, indicated that the condition precedent of satisfaction was met. Therefore, the Supreme Court found the High Court's interpretation erroneous and held that the notification was valid. Conclusion: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's judgment and decree. The judgment and decree of the Trial Court, confirmed by the Additional District Judge, dismissing the suit of the 1st respondent Society, were restored. The 1st respondent Society was ordered to pay the costs in the Supreme Court and the High Court.
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