2001 (4) TMI 934 - HC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Whether the Commissioner under the Workmen's Compensation Act is a Court.
2. Whether the order of the Commissioner is a judgment.
3. Whether an order passed by a single Judge of the High Court under Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act is a judgment within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent (Bombay).

Detailed Analysis:

Issue 1: Whether the Commissioner under the Workmen's Compensation Act is a Court.
The appellant's counsel argued that the Commissioner acts as a Court because the Commissioner performs functions analogous to those of a Civil Court, such as settling disputes, recording evidence, and pronouncing judgments. The Commissioner has powers under the Code of Civil Procedure, such as taking evidence on oath and enforcing attendance of witnesses. The counsel cited the Supreme Court's judgment in Thakur Jugal Kishore Sinha v. The Sitamarhi Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. and Anr., which held that quasi-judicial tribunals deciding disputes judicially are Courts.

The respondents' counsel contended that the Commissioner is a Tribunal, not a Court. Sections 19(2) and 3(5) of the Act bar the jurisdiction of Civil Courts and explicitly state that the Commissioner is not a Civil Court. The Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Yeshwantrao v. Sampat held that the Commissioner is not a Court within the meaning of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The judgment concluded that the Commissioner under the Workmen's Compensation Act is not a Court. The Commissioner is a Tribunal created under a special statute to provide a speedy, cheap, and effective remedy distinct from the regular Civil Courts. The legislative intent was to create a separate forum for settling disputes under the Act, thereby excluding the jurisdiction of Civil Courts.

Issue 2: Whether the order of the Commissioner is a judgment.
The appellant's counsel argued that the Commissioner's decision should be considered a judgment because it involves adjudication of disputes, recording of evidence, and pronouncing decisions similar to a Civil Court. The counsel relied on the judgment in Smt. Rajiyabi Cosman Sayi and Anr. v. Mackinon Machinazie & Co. Pvt. Ltd., where it was held that the Commissioner's decision is a judgment.

The respondents' counsel contended that the Commissioner's decision is not a judgment but an award. The Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Yeshwantrao v. Sampat held that the Commissioner's order is not revisable by the High Court and is not a judgment within the meaning of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The judgment concluded that the Commissioner's decision is not a judgment but an award. The Commissioner is not a part of the ordinary hierarchy of Civil Courts, and the legislative intent was to create a distinct forum for adjudicating claims under the Act. The decision rendered by the Commissioner does not fall within the ambit of a "judgment" as envisaged in the Letters Patent.

Issue 3: Whether an order passed by a single Judge of the High Court under Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act is a judgment within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent (Bombay).
The appellant's counsel argued that the order passed by a single Judge in an appeal under Section 30 of the Act is a judgment within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The counsel cited the judgment in Mohanlal v. Fine Knitting Mills Co., which held that the Commissioner is a Court subordinate to the High Court, and thus, the single Judge's order is a judgment.

The respondents' counsel contended that not all orders of the Commissioner are appealable, and the High Court's jurisdiction under Section 30 is limited to substantial questions of law. The Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Yeshwantrao v. Sampat held that the Commissioner is not a Court, and the single Judge's order under Section 30 is not a judgment as envisaged in the Letters Patent.

The judgment concluded that the order passed by a single Judge in an appeal under Section 30 of the Act is not a judgment within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The Commissioner is not a Court subordinate to the High Court, and the legislative intent was to provide finality to the decisions rendered by the Commissioner. The decision of the single Judge in such appeals is akin to a second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and Section 100-A bars any further appeal under the Letters Patent.

Conclusion:
The judgment overruled the Division Bench's decision in Smt. Rajiyabi Cosman Sayi and Anr. v. Mackinon Machinazie & Co. Pvt. Ltd. and held that the Commissioner under the Workmen's Compensation Act is not a Court, his decision is not a judgment, and the order passed by a single Judge of the High Court under Section 30 of the Act is not a judgment within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent (Bombay).