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2015 (10) TMI 2687 - SC - Indian Laws


  1. 2016 (11) TMI 545 - SC
  2. 2015 (3) TMI 814 - SC
  3. 2014 (9) TMI 821 - SC
  4. 2014 (9) TMI 992 - SC
  5. 2015 (4) TMI 154 - SC
  6. 2014 (5) TMI 1110 - SC
  7. 2014 (5) TMI 783 - SC
  8. 2013 (7) TMI 878 - SC
  9. 2012 (9) TMI 374 - SC
  10. 2012 (2) TMI 568 - SC
  11. 2011 (8) TMI 1086 - SC
  12. 2011 (5) TMI 868 - SC
  13. 2011 (3) TMI 1554 - SC
  14. 2011 (3) TMI 1561 - SC
  15. 2010 (12) TMI 1161 - SC
  16. 2010 (5) TMI 393 - SC
  17. 2010 (5) TMI 784 - SC
  18. 2010 (5) TMI 751 - SC
  19. 2010 (4) TMI 849 - SC
  20. 2009 (7) TMI 1302 - SC
  21. 2008 (12) TMI 448 - SC
  22. 2008 (4) TMI 775 - SC
  23. 2008 (2) TMI 850 - SC
  24. 2008 (1) TMI 605 - SC
  25. 2007 (5) TMI 619 - SC
  26. 2007 (1) TMI 541 - SC
  27. 2006 (10) TMI 420 - SC
  28. 2006 (8) TMI 583 - SC
  29. 2006 (8) TMI 635 - SC
  30. 2006 (5) TMI 474 - SC
  31. 2004 (12) TMI 350 - SC
  32. 2004 (10) TMI 553 - SC
  33. 2004 (1) TMI 71 - SC
  34. 2003 (1) TMI 715 - SC
  35. 2002 (10) TMI 739 - SC
  36. 2002 (4) TMI 890 - SC
  37. 2002 (2) TMI 1101 - SC
  38. 2001 (8) TMI 1370 - SC
  39. 2000 (2) TMI 823 - SC
  40. 1998 (10) TMI 537 - SC
  41. 1997 (3) TMI 90 - SC
  42. 1996 (12) TMI 50 - SC
  43. 1996 (12) TMI 383 - SC
  44. 1996 (9) TMI 610 - SC
  45. 1996 (3) TMI 525 - SC
  46. 1996 (2) TMI 526 - SC
  47. 1995 (7) TMI 422 - SC
  48. 1994 (3) TMI 380 - SC
  49. 1994 (3) TMI 379 - SC
  50. 1993 (10) TMI 352 - SC
  51. 1993 (8) TMI 296 - SC
  52. 1993 (3) TMI 363 - SC
  53. 1993 (2) TMI 333 - SC
  54. 1992 (11) TMI 254 - SC
  55. 1992 (11) TMI 277 - SC
  56. 1992 (3) TMI 345 - SC
  57. 1992 (2) TMI 364 - SC
  58. 1991 (11) TMI 254 - SC
  59. 1991 (8) TMI 338 - SC
  60. 1990 (10) TMI 376 - SC
  61. 1990 (7) TMI 3 - SC
  62. 1989 (10) TMI 53 - SC
  63. 1989 (5) TMI 54 - SC
  64. 1989 (5) TMI 316 - SC
  65. 1989 (3) TMI 356 - SC
  66. 1988 (9) TMI 340 - SC
  67. 1987 (1) TMI 483 - SC
  68. 1986 (3) TMI 328 - SC
  69. 1985 (8) TMI 373 - SC
  70. 1985 (2) TMI 298 - SC
  71. 1984 (12) TMI 65 - SC
  72. 1982 (12) TMI 220 - SC
  73. 1981 (12) TMI 165 - SC
  74. 1981 (12) TMI 166 - SC
  75. 1981 (11) TMI 57 - SC
  76. 1981 (4) TMI 273 - SC
  77. 1980 (11) TMI 170 - SC
  78. 1980 (11) TMI 159 - SC
  79. 1980 (7) TMI 262 - SC
  80. 1980 (4) TMI 309 - SC
  81. 1979 (9) TMI 176 - SC
  82. 1978 (12) TMI 184 - SC
  83. 1977 (11) TMI 139 - SC
  84. 1977 (9) TMI 115 - SC
  85. 1977 (6) TMI 99 - SC
  86. 1976 (10) TMI 149 - SC
  87. 1976 (4) TMI 211 - SC
  88. 1975 (11) TMI 165 - SC
  89. 1975 (2) TMI 118 - SC
  90. 1975 (1) TMI 88 - SC
  91. 1974 (11) TMI 103 - SC
  92. 1974 (11) TMI 76 - SC
  93. 1974 (8) TMI 108 - SC
  94. 1974 (5) TMI 113 - SC
  95. 1974 (4) TMI 100 - SC
  96. 1973 (4) TMI 114 - SC
  97. 1971 (10) TMI 31 - SC
  98. 1971 (1) TMI 108 - SC
  99. 1970 (12) TMI 87 - SC
  100. 1970 (9) TMI 104 - SC
  101. 1969 (10) TMI 70 - SC
  102. 1969 (1) TMI 75 - SC
  103. 1968 (12) TMI 97 - SC
  104. 1968 (12) TMI 93 - SC
  105. 1977 (8) TMI 165 - SC
  106. 1967 (2) TMI 95 - SC
  107. 1966 (8) TMI 64 - SC
  108. 1966 (5) TMI 36 - SC
  109. 1966 (3) TMI 77 - SC
  110. 1965 (2) TMI 8 - SC
  111. 1964 (12) TMI 40 - SC
  112. 1964 (11) TMI 100 - SC
  113. 1963 (8) TMI 46 - SC
  114. 1962 (11) TMI 24 - SC
  115. 1962 (11) TMI 45 - SC
  116. 1961 (12) TMI 1 - SC
  117. 1961 (9) TMI 3 - SC
  118. 1961 (4) TMI 87 - SC
  119. 1960 (12) TMI 84 - SC
  120. 1960 (8) TMI 69 - SC
  121. 1959 (5) TMI 4 - SC
  122. 1958 (4) TMI 110 - SC
  123. 1958 (3) TMI 57 - SC
  124. 1956 (4) TMI 55 - SC
  125. 1956 (3) TMI 2 - SC
  126. 1955 (9) TMI 37 - SC
  127. 1955 (4) TMI 35 - SC
  128. 1955 (1) TMI 35 - SC
  129. 1954 (4) TMI 29 - SC
  130. 1953 (3) TMI 16 - SC
  131. 1952 (10) TMI 28 - SC
  132. 1952 (3) TMI 34 - SC
  133. 1952 (1) TMI 19 - SC
  134. 1950 (12) TMI 17 - SC
  135. 1950 (5) TMI 24 - SC
Issues Involved:

1. Independence of the judiciary.
2. Separation between the judiciary and the executive.
3. Appointment and transfer of judges.
4. Role of the Chief Justice of India in judicial appointments.
5. Role of the executive in judicial appointments.
6. Constitutional validity of the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC).
7. Interpretation of "consultation" in the context of judicial appointments.
8. Primacy of the judiciary in appointments.
9. Impact of the 99th Constitution Amendment Act and the NJAC Act on the basic structure of the Constitution.
10. Transparency and accountability in the judicial appointment process.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Independence of the Judiciary:
The judgment emphasizes that the independence of the judiciary is a basic feature of the Constitution. The independence of the judiciary is not limited to independence from executive pressure or influence but encompasses freedom from many other pressures and prejudices. This independence is manifested in the ability of a judge to make decisions without external or internal pressure, termed as "decisional independence," and the institution's ability to have "functional independence."

2. Separation between the Judiciary and the Executive:
Article 50 of the Constitution mandates the separation of the judiciary from the executive. The judgment highlights the historical context and debates in the Constituent Assembly, which emphasized the need for this separation to ensure an independent judiciary. The judgment discusses instances where executive interference in judicial matters was criticized, reinforcing the need for a clear separation to maintain judicial independence.

3. Appointment and Transfer of Judges:
The judgment underscores that the appointment and transfer of judges are integral to the independence of the judiciary. Historically, the recommendation for judicial appointments has originated from the judiciary, and the Chief Justice of India (CJI) has played a pivotal role in this process. The judgment critiques the 99th Constitution Amendment Act and the NJAC Act for altering this established process, thereby impacting judicial independence.

4. Role of the Chief Justice of India in Judicial Appointments:
The judgment stresses that the CJI's role in judicial appointments is crucial for maintaining judicial independence. The CJI's opinion, formed in consultation with other senior judges, has traditionally held significant weight in the appointment process. The judgment criticizes the NJAC for reducing the CJI to a mere voting member, thereby undermining the judiciary's role in appointments.

5. Role of the Executive in Judicial Appointments:
The judgment expresses concerns about the executive's involvement in judicial appointments. It highlights the potential for executive interference to compromise judicial independence. The inclusion of the Law Minister in the NJAC and the provision allowing two members to veto appointments are seen as mechanisms that could enable executive influence over judicial appointments.

6. Constitutional Validity of the NJAC:
The judgment declares the 99th Constitution Amendment Act and the NJAC Act unconstitutional. It argues that these acts alter the basic structure of the Constitution by undermining the primacy of the judiciary in judicial appointments. The judgment emphasizes that any changes to the appointment process must preserve the judiciary's independence and its role in upholding the rule of law.

7. Interpretation of "Consultation" in the Context of Judicial Appointments:
The judgment discusses the interpretation of "consultation" in Articles 124 and 217 of the Constitution. It argues that "consultation" with the CJI should be understood as requiring significant weight to be given to the judiciary's opinion. The judgment critiques the NJAC for not adequately respecting this interpretation and for allowing non-judicial members to have a decisive say in appointments.

8. Primacy of the Judiciary in Appointments:
The judgment reaffirms the primacy of the judiciary in the appointment process as essential for maintaining judicial independence. It criticizes the NJAC for diluting this primacy by allowing the executive and non-judicial members to have an equal or overriding role in appointments.

9. Impact of the 99th Constitution Amendment Act and the NJAC Act on the Basic Structure of the Constitution:
The judgment concludes that the 99th Constitution Amendment Act and the NJAC Act alter the basic structure of the Constitution by undermining the judiciary's independence and its primacy in judicial appointments. It emphasizes that the basic structure doctrine limits the Parliament's power to amend the Constitution, and any amendment that damages this structure is unconstitutional.

10. Transparency and Accountability in the Judicial Appointment Process:
While acknowledging the need for transparency and accountability, the judgment argues that these objectives should not be achieved at the cost of judicial independence. It critiques the NJAC for potentially compromising the judiciary's independence under the guise of promoting transparency and accountability.

The judgment ultimately declares the 99th Constitution Amendment Act and the NJAC Act unconstitutional, reinstating the collegium system for judicial appointments and transfers. It calls for a "consequence hearing" to address potential improvements to the collegium system to enhance transparency and accountability while preserving judicial independence.

 

 

 

 

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