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Issues Involved:
1. Entitlement to retain lands under the West Bengal Estates' Acquisition Act, 1953. 2. Validity of the State Government's right to collect rent from the lessee. 3. Interpretation of "intermediary" and "khas possession" under the Act. 4. The impact of statutory amendments on the rights of intermediaries. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Entitlement to Retain Lands: The main dispute revolves around whether the writ petitioner is entitled to retain the lands comprised in plot Nos. 11 and 32 under Khatyan Nos. 21 and 390 respectively of Mouza Kalidah, under the West Bengal Estates' Acquisition Act, 1953. The petitioner claimed entitlement to retain these lands by submitting a return in Form 'B' under section 6 of the Act. The Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court ruled in favor of the petitioner, holding that he was not an agricultural tenant within the meaning of clause (k) of section 2 of the Act and thus not an intermediary as defined in the Act. 2. Validity of State Government's Right to Collect Rent: The petitioner contended that the State Government had no right to collect rent from the lessee, M/s Scene Screen (Pvt.) Ltd., as he was entitled to retain the lands under section 6(1)(b) of the Act. The Division Bench directed the State Government not to recognize the lessee as a tenant under the State and not to realize rent from it, thus supporting the petitioner's claim. 3. Interpretation of "Intermediary" and "Khas Possession": The Division Bench held that the petitioner was not an intermediary under the Act, as his interest in the land did not vest in the State. The learned single Judge had earlier interpreted section 6(1)(b) to mean that an intermediary could only retain land in actual possession, but the Division Bench disagreed, stating that the plain language of the section did not require "khas possession" for retention of land appertaining to buildings or structures. 4. Impact of Statutory Amendments: The statutory provisions of the Act as they stood prior to the amendment in 1961 were relevant for deciding the case. Section 6(1)(b) did not stipulate that the intermediary should be in khas possession of the land comprised in or appertaining to buildings or structures. The Division Bench concluded that the learned single Judge erred in introducing the condition of khas possession into section 6(1)(b), which was not stipulated by the Act. Conclusion: The Supreme Court upheld the Division Bench's judgment, endorsing its decision that the petitioner was entitled to retain the land leased to the lessee for constructing a cinema hall. The appeal was dismissed without any order for costs, affirming that the plain and unambiguous language of section 6(1)(b) did not require khas possession for the retention of land appertaining to buildings or structures.
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