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Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the constitution of the Disciplinary Committee. 2. Allegation of institutional bias against the Disciplinary Committee members. Detailed Analysis: 1. Validity of the Constitution of the Disciplinary Committee: The petitioner challenged the constitution of the Disciplinary Committee on the grounds that it was not validly constituted as per Rule 1(q) of the BCCI rules, which mandates that the President must be a member of the Committee. The petitioner argued that since the President had recused himself, the Committee should either wait for a new President to be elected or be reconstituted with unbiased members acceptable to the petitioner. The Court noted that Rule 1(q) states the Board shall appoint a Committee consisting of three persons, including the President. However, the rule does not explicitly prohibit substitution if the President recuses himself. The Court interpreted the word "shall" in the rule as "may," allowing for flexibility in situations where the President cannot serve. The Court emphasized that the doctrine of necessity justified the substitution of the President with another member, as the inquiry could not be delayed for a new President to be elected. The Court upheld the validity of the Committee's constitution, stating that the rule is elastic enough to allow for such substitutions and that the petitioner cannot dictate the members of the Committee. The Court found no error in the Bombay High Court's judgment that accepted the substitution based on the doctrine of necessity. 2. Allegation of Institutional Bias: The petitioner alleged institutional bias against the members of the Disciplinary Committee, arguing that they could not expect fair play from members who had already been part of the decision to initiate disciplinary action against him. The petitioner cited previous participation of the Committee members in meetings where decisions against him were made as a basis for his apprehension of bias. The Court considered the principles of natural justice and the test of "real likelihood" or "real danger" of bias. The Court referred to the Constitution Bench judgment in M.P. Special Police Establishment vs. State of M.P., which established that mere apprehension of bias is not sufficient; there must be a real danger of bias. The Court also cited T.P. Daver vs. Lodge Victoria, which held that members of a society must abide by its rules and cannot demand an outside tribunal unless the inquiry discloses malafides or unfair treatment. The Court found that the petitioner's allegations of bias were not substantiated by the material on record. The petitioner had previously stated that he had no personal allegations against two of the Committee members and only alleged institutional bias. The Court concluded that the petitioner's apprehension did not amount to a real danger of bias and that the Committee would afford him a fair hearing. The Court dismissed the petitioner's claim of bias, stating that accepting such a view would lead to demands for interference in inquiries conducted by all other societies in similar situations, which is not permissible under the law. Conclusion: The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the Disciplinary Committee's constitution and rejected the allegations of institutional bias. The Court found no error in the Bombay High Court's judgments and dismissed all three petitions, with each party bearing its own litigation costs.
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