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Issues Involved:
1. Applicability of the principle of res judicata. 2. Executability of the mortgage decree under the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Applicability of the Principle of Res Judicata: The primary question was whether the objection raised by the judgment debtors regarding the executability of the decree was barred by the principle of res judicata. The judgment debtors had previously filed applications (Misc. Case Nos. 94 and 110 of 1959) which were dismissed for default. The court held that for a plea to be barred by res judicata, it must have been heard and finally decided by the court. Dismissals for default do not constitute a final decision. The court cited the Judicial Committee's decision in Maharaja Radha Parshad Singh v. Lal Sahab Rai, which stated that dismissal for default does not operate as res judicata. The court also referenced several other cases supporting this view, including Pulvarthi Venkata Subba Rao v. Velluri Jagannadha Rao and others. Consequently, the court agreed with the High Court that the plea of res judicata was unsustainable. 2. Executability of the Mortgage Decree under the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950: The second issue was whether the mortgage decree had become unexecutable due to the provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950. The judgment debtors argued that the execution was barred under the Act, while the appellants contended that the Bakasht lands, part of the mortgaged property, had not vested in the State and hence could be proceeded against. The court examined Sections 3, 4, and 6 of the Act. Section 4(a) states that once an estate vests in the State, all rights, including possession, vest in the State free from all encumbrances. Section 6 provides that lands in khas possession of an intermediary are deemed to be settled with such intermediary as a raiyat under the State. The court concluded that the entire mortgaged estate had vested in the State, and the proprietary interest was lost, although some rights were settled back on the proprietors as raiyats. Section 4(d) of the Act specifies that no suit for recovery of money secured by a mortgage on such estate shall lie in any civil court, and all pending suits and proceedings shall be dropped. The court held that the only remedy available to the decree-holders was to claim compensation under Chapter IV of the Act, not to proceed with execution. This interpretation was supported by previous decisions of the Supreme Court, including Rana Sheo Ambar Singh v. Allahabad Bank Ltd. and Krishna Prasad v. Gauri Kumari Devi, which dealt with similar provisions under different land reform acts. The court emphasized that the scheme of the Act required claims to be submitted before the Claims Officer, and no remedy outside the Act was permissible. The court concluded that the decision of the majority in the Full Bench decision in Sidheshwar Prasad Singh v. Ram Saroop Singh was incorrect and aligned with the interpretation provided by Kamla Sahai, J. The appeal was dismissed with costs, affirming the High Court's decision that the execution of the mortgage decree was barred under the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950. Conclusion: The appeal was dismissed, and it was held that the objection regarding executability was not barred by res judicata, and the execution of the mortgage decree was barred under the provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950. The decree-holders were directed to seek compensation under the Act.
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