2005 (2) TMI 876 - SC - Indian Laws

Constitutional validity of Section 6-A of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 ('the Act') - requirement to obtain prior approval of the Central Government - HELD THAT - Learned Solicitor General, on the other hand, though very fairly admitting that the nexus between criminals and some elements of establishment including politicians and various sections of bureaucracy has increased and also that there is a disturbing increase in the level of corruption and these problems need to be addressed, infractions of the law need to be investigated, investigations have to be conducted quickly and effectively without any interference and the investigative agencies should be allowed to function without any interference of any kind whatsoever and that they have to be insulated from any extraneous influences of any kind, contends that a legislation cannot be struck down on the ground of arbitrariness or unreasonableness as such a ground is available only to quash executive action and orders. Further contention is that even a delegated legislation cannot be quashed on the ground of mere arbitrariness and even for quashing such a legislation, manifest arbitrariness is the requirement of law. In support, reliance has been placed on observations made in a Three Judge Bench decision in State of A.P. and Ors. v. McDowell Co. and Ors. 1996 (3) TMI 525 - SUPREME COURT that no enactment can be struck down by just saying that it is arbitrary or unreasonable and observations made in Khoday Distilleries Ltd. and Ors. v. State of Karnataka and Ors. 1995 (12) TMI 378 - SUPREME COURT that delegated legislation can be struck down only if there is manifest arbitrariness. Further contention of learned Solicitor General is that the conclusion drawn in Vineet Narain's case 1997 (12) TMI 615 - SUPREME COURT is erroneous that the Constitution Bench decision in K. Veeraswami v. Union of India and Ors. 1991 (7) TMI 368 - SUPREME COURT is not an authority for the proposition that in the case of high officials, requirement of prior permission/sanction from a higher officer or Head of the Department is permissible, the submission is that conclusion reached in Vineet Narain's decision run contrary to observations and findings in Veeraswami's case. Having regard to the aforesaid, we are of the view that the matters deserve to be heard by a larger Bench, subject to the orders of Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India.

Summary

Issues involved:
Constitutional validity of Section 6-A of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946.

Issue 1: Validity of Section 6-A under Article 14 of the Constitution

The petition challenges the constitutional validity of Section 6-A of the Act, which requires prior approval of the Central Government for inquiries or investigations related to offenses under the Prevention of Corruption Act against officers of Joint Secretary level and above. The provision was inserted in 2003, replacing the earlier 'Single Directive' aimed at protecting decision-making level officers from malicious inquiries. The petitioner argues that this provision hampers independent investigations of bureaucrats, undermines the rule of law, and allows high-ranking officials to influence whether inquiries are initiated against them. The petitioner contends that such protection of public servants is irrational and arbitrary, violating Article 14 of the Constitution. The challenge is supported by legal precedents emphasizing the importance of non-arbitrariness in laws, including cases like S.G. Jaisinghani v. Union of India and Mardia Chemicals Ltd. v. Union of India.

Issue 2: Arguments for and against the validity of Section 6-A

The Solicitor General acknowledges the rise in criminal-political-bureaucratic nexus and corruption, emphasizing the need for effective investigations free from interference. However, he argues that legislation cannot be invalidated solely on grounds of arbitrariness or unreasonableness, as such grounds are typically used to challenge executive actions rather than legislative provisions. Citing legal precedents, the Solicitor General asserts that manifest arbitrariness is required to strike down legislation, and mere arbitrariness is insufficient. The debate centers on whether arbitrariness and unreasonableness, as facets of Article 14, can be used to invalidate legislation, with both sides relying on judgments by three-Judge Benches to support their positions.

Separate Judgement:

The Court, led by Justice Y.K. Sabharwal, has referred the matter to a larger Bench, subject to the Chief Justice of India's orders, indicating the complexity and significance of the issues raised regarding the constitutional validity of Section 6-A of the Act. This decision reflects the need for further deliberation and examination by a broader judicial forum to address the legal intricacies involved in the case.