1954 (3) TMI 77 - HC - Companies Law

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Whether the appellant qualifies as a "workman" under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
2. Whether the appellant's employment constitutes a "process involving the use of lead" under Schedule III of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
3. The applicability of the Factories Act of 1948 versus the Factories Act of 1934 in defining "manufacturing process."

Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Whether the appellant qualifies as a "workman" under the Workmen's Compensation Act:

The respondent contended that the appellant was not a "workman" as defined under the Workmen's Compensation Act, asserting that the Commissioner applied the wrong definition of "manufacturing process" from the Factories Act of 1948 instead of the Factories Act of 1934. The relevant clause in Schedule II of the Workmen's Compensation Act defines "workman" as a person employed in any premises where ten or more persons have been employed in any manufacturing process as defined in Clause (g) of Section 2, Factories Act, 1934.

The court found this contention "plainly unsound," stating that the Factories Act of 1934 had been repealed and re-enacted by the Factories Act of 1948. By virtue of Section 8 of the General Clauses Act, references to the Act of 1934 must be construed as references to the Act of 1948. The court noted that the Factories Act of 1948 was a consolidating and amending Act, not merely a repealing and amending Act, and thus Section 8 of the General Clauses Act still applied. Therefore, the Commissioner was right in applying the definition of "manufacturing process" from the Factories Act of 1948 and holding that the appellant was a workman.

2. Whether the appellant's employment constitutes a "process involving the use of lead" under Schedule III of the Workmen's Compensation Act:

The principal question was whether the appellant's employment in handling lead constituted a "process involving the use of lead" as specified in Part B of Schedule III. The appellant, employed as an impositor in a printing press, suffered from chronic lead poisoning due to his work. The Commissioner had dismissed the claim, interpreting that the schedule distinguished between "handling" and "process," and since the appellant's employment involved handling but not a process, he was not entitled to compensation.

The court disagreed, stating that the term "process" is not mutually exclusive of "handling." The court referred to the Oxford Dictionary definition of "process" as a "continuous and regular action or succession of actions, taking place or carried on in a definite manner, and leading to the accomplishment of some result." This definition does not exclude handling. The court noted that the schedule itself includes entries that combine handling and use, such as "any process involving the handling or use of tar."

The court concluded that the appellant's employment, which involved arranging and fixing lead bars from a linotype machine, constituted a process involving the use of lead. The appellant's duties were not mere handling but involved an intelligent operation using lead, thus falling within the scope of Section 3(2) and Schedule III of the Act.

3. The applicability of the Factories Act of 1948 versus the Factories Act of 1934 in defining "manufacturing process":

The respondent argued that the definition of "manufacturing process" from the Factories Act of 1934 should apply, which did not include "printing by letterpress, lithography, photogravure or other similar work." The court rejected this argument, stating that the Factories Act of 1948, which repealed and re-enacted the 1934 Act, should be applied as per Section 8 of the General Clauses Act. The court emphasized that the 1948 Act was a consolidating and amending Act and not merely a repealing and amending Act, thus Section 8 was applicable.

The court also addressed the argument that the repeal of the Factories Act of 1934 had been nullified by the Repealing and Amending Act of 1950, stating that such Acts are meant for editorial revision and do not change the law. The principle derived from the repeal of the 1934 Act by the 1948 Act remains unaffected, and references to the 1934 Act should be read as references to the 1948 Act. Therefore, the Commissioner was correct in applying the definition from the Factories Act of 1948.

Judgment:

The appeal was allowed, and the judgment and order of the Commissioner were set aside. The appellant's application for compensation was granted, and the respondent was ordered to pay Rs. 2,940/- as compensation along with the costs of the appeal. No order for costs was made for the trial court due to the complexity of the point involved.