1929 (7) TMI 1 - DSC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Whether defendant 4 was a party to the compromise.
2. Whether the court has inherent power to correct its own proceedings.
3. Whether the application for revision under Sections 151 and 152, Civil Procedure Code (CPC) is maintainable.
4. Whether the decree passed on the basis of the compromise is binding on defendant 4.
5. Whether the court can correct its decree after the limitation period for appeal has expired.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Whether defendant 4 was a party to the compromise:
The court examined the record and found that Mohammad Raza (defendant 4) was not a party to the compromise. Despite his name being noted in the petition of compromise, neither he nor his pleader or agent signed it. The pleader, Saiyid Zaigham Ali, who appeared for defendants 3 and 4, did not sign the compromise on behalf of defendant 4 and had no authority to do so according to his vakalatnama. The court noted that the learned Subordinate Judge failed to verify whether the compromise was duly signed by defendant 4 or his authorized representative. Consequently, the compromise is not binding on defendant 4, and the decree passed based on the compromise is void as to him.

2. Whether the court has inherent power to correct its own proceedings:
The court affirmed that it has inherent power to correct its own proceedings. Citing the case of Devendra Nath v. Ram Rachpal, the court noted that every court has the inherent power to set aside its own decree based on a compromise filed by a person without authority. This power can be exercised under Sections 151, 152, or 153, CPC, irrespective of whether it is a power in review.

3. Whether the application for revision under Sections 151 and 152, CPC is maintainable:
The respondents' counsel contended that the application for revision is not maintainable as an appeal lies from the final decree. However, the court rejected this contention, stating that the applicant, having not appealed from the preliminary decree, was precluded under Section 97, CPC from disputing its correctness in any appeal from the final decree. The court noted that Mohammad Raza could have appealed from the preliminary decree, but he failed to do so within the period provided by law. The application under Sections 151 and 152, CPC was made long after the limitation period for appealing had expired.

4. Whether the decree passed on the basis of the compromise is binding on defendant 4:
The court concluded that the decree passed on the basis of the compromise is void as to defendant 4 since he never consented to the compromise. The court emphasized that the compromise was not signed by defendant 4 or his authorized representative, and therefore, it cannot be binding on him.

5. Whether the court can correct its decree after the limitation period for appeal has expired:
The court referred to the case of Tola Ram v. Panna Lal, which held that the court cannot ignore the provisions of the law of limitation by appealing to Section 151, CPC. However, the court noted that it has the inherent power to correct its own proceedings, even if the decree is in conformity with the judgment and the limitation period for appeal has expired. The court decided to refer the following questions to a Full Bench for a definitive ruling:
- Is it open to a party to a suit to appeal from a decree passed on the basis of a compromise when the person verifying or admitting the compromise had no authority to do so?
- Is it open to such a party to invoke the inherent power of the court to amend the judgment and decree under Sections 151, 152, and 153, CPC, after the limitation period for appeal or review has expired?

Full Bench Opinion:

Stuart, C.J.:
The Chief Judge opined that it is open to a party to appeal from a decree passed on the basis of a compromise when the person verifying or admitting the compromise had no authority. He also stated that a party can invoke the inherent power of the court to amend the judgment and decree under Sections 151, 152, and 153, CPC, even after the limitation period for appeal or review has expired. However, the court must decide whether the application deserves consideration based on the merits.

Wazir Hasan, J.:
Justice Hasan agreed that an appeal could be preferred from a decree passed on the basis of a compromise if the person verifying or admitting the compromise had no authority. He also affirmed that a party can invoke the inherent power of the court to amend the judgment and decree under Sections 151, 152, and 153, CPC, even after the limitation period for appeal or review has expired. He emphasized that time is of no consequence in matters where a decree is a nullity.

Raza, J.:
Justice Raza concurred with the Chief Judge's judgment and answered both questions in the affirmative.