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Issues Involved:
1. Whether the rectification applications are barred by limitation. 2. Whether the rectification applications are a misuse of the process of law and not tenable in law. 3. The applicability of Section 111 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958. 4. The status and jurisdiction of the High Court under the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958. 5. The applicability of the Limitation Act, 1963 to rectification applications under the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958. Detailed Analysis: 1. Barred by Limitation: The appellants contended that the Limitation Act does not apply to proceedings under the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, as no specific period is prescribed for making rectification applications. Conversely, the respondents argued that since the application was made to the High Court, which is a civil court, the Limitation Act applies, and Article 137 of the Limitation Act would govern the issue. The court concluded that the applications are barred by limitation, as the appellants failed to raise the contention about the invalidity of the trade mark in their written statement when served with the suit summons, and no recurring cause of action is arising in favor of the appellants. 2. Misuse of Process of Law: The court examined whether the rectification applications constituted a misuse of the process of law. It was found that the appellants did raise a plea about the invalidity of the respondent's trade mark in their written statement in the suit filed by the respondent. However, the court noted that the appellants had overtly abandoned this plea by not insisting on framing an issue related to the invalidity of the mark during the trial. Consequently, the court held that the appellants could not raise the issue de hors the suit by filing a rectification application independently. 3. Applicability of Section 111: Section 111 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, mandates that if a plea regarding the invalidity of a trade mark is raised in a suit for infringement, the court must stay the suit and allow the party to apply to the High Court for rectification. The court emphasized that once a suit for infringement is filed and a plea of invalidity is raised, the issue must be decided within the framework of Section 111. The court found that the appellants had abandoned their plea by not insisting on framing an issue related to the invalidity of the mark during the trial, and thus, they could not raise the issue independently through a rectification application. 4. Status and Jurisdiction of the High Court: The court clarified that the High Court, while exercising jurisdiction under the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, is a court and not a tribunal. The court emphasized that the High Court remains a court for the purpose of the Limitation Act, even when dealing with applications under the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act. The court rejected the contention that the High Court acts as a tribunal when exercising jurisdiction under the Act. 5. Applicability of the Limitation Act: The court held that the Limitation Act, 1963, applies to applications made to the High Court under the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958. The court noted that the Limitation Act extends to all applications made to a court, including those under special laws, unless expressly excluded. The court observed that the incongruity between the applicability of the Limitation Act to the High Court and not to the Registrar arises from legislative changes and should be addressed by the legislature. Conclusion: The court concluded that the rectification applications are barred by limitation and not maintainable. The appellants had abandoned their plea regarding the invalidity of the trade mark during the trial of the suit, and thus, they could not raise the issue independently through a rectification application. The court dismissed the appeals and held that the Limitation Act applies to applications made to the High Court under the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958.
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