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Issues involved: Interpretation of powers conferred by Section 3 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 regarding the obligation to specify the period for which directions issued by the Textile Commissioner will remain in operation.
Summary: The Supreme Court, in the judgment delivered by Justice Chandrachud, addressed the issue of whether the Textile Commissioner is obligated to specify the period for which directions issued to manufacturers will be in force. The Court referred to the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, specifically the Cotton Textiles (Control) Order, 1948, which empowers the Textile Commissioner to issue directions to manufacturers regarding production quantities. The Court emphasized that the word "may" can be interpreted as "must" or "shall" based on the context, and when discretion is coupled with an obligation, "may" should be construed as a command. It was held that the power to issue directions is linked with the duty to specify a particular period for their operation. This is crucial for timely review and to prevent directions from continuing beyond their utility. The judgment affirmed that directions must be limited to a determinate period to facilitate necessary reviews and enable manufacturers to plan their business effectively. Consequently, the impugned Notification prohibiting certain activities for an indefinite period was deemed ultra vires clause 20 of the Cotton Textiles (Control) Order, 1948. The Court dismissed the appeals and ordered the appellants to pay costs to the respondents. Separate Judgment: No separate judgment was delivered by the judges in this case.
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