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Issues Involved:
1. Applicability of amended Section 48 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act. 2. Whether the claim of the Custodian is barred by limitation. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Applicability of Amended Section 48 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act: The primary question is whether the amended Section 48 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, which came into force on October 22, 1956, can be applied to the present case. The amended Section 48 is procedural and allows sums payable to the Government or Custodian to be recovered as arrears of land revenue. It also provides that the Custodian's decision on whether a sum is payable is final, subject to appeal or revision, and not open to court challenge. Additionally, it states that a sum shall be deemed payable to the Custodian even if its recovery is barred by the Indian Limitation Act or any other law relating to limitation of action. The court held that procedural amendments apply retrospectively unless stated otherwise. Therefore, the amended Section 48 applies to all actions after its commencement, even if the claim arose earlier. The court rejected the appellant's argument that Section 48(1) does not apply, clarifying that the section deals with sums payable in respect of evacuee property and not the property itself. The right to recover the amount, an actionable claim, vested in the Custodian and could be recovered under the amended Section 48. 2. Whether the Claim of the Custodian is Barred by Limitation: The appellant argued that the right to recover the amount as a deposit had become barred by limitation, and thus, the Custodian could not recover it under the amended Section 48. The court examined the timeline: the deposit was made in January 1946, and the appellant's sister migrated to Pakistan between June and August 1949. The right to recover the amount vested in the Custodian at the time of migration, and there was no evidence of a demand for the return of the money before the migration. Therefore, the limitation period had not begun to run at the time of migration. The appellant contended that the demand made on January 10, 1952, would make the claim barred by January 1955 under Article 60 of the Limitation Act. However, the appellant had not raised this issue before the authorities, focusing instead on the argument that the amount was a loan. The court held that the appellant could not raise this new argument at this stage, as it would involve factual determinations that were not previously investigated. Consequently, the court did not address the exact effect of Section 48(3) on cases where recovery was barred before October 22, 1956. Conclusion: The appeal was dismissed with costs. The court upheld the applicability of the amended Section 48 to the case and did not allow the appellant to argue that the claim was barred by limitation, as this issue was not raised earlier. The Custodian's right to recover the amount as an actionable claim vested in them and could be pursued under the amended procedural provisions.
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