9911796707
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Issues Involved:
1. Jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure to interfere with findings of fact. 2. Validity and binding nature of the release deed executed by Respondent No. 2. 3. Allegations of fraud and lack of independent advice in the execution of the release deed. 4. Limitation period for filing the suit. Detailed Analysis: 1. Jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure The primary question raised in this appeal is whether the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure by interfering with the findings of fact recorded by the lower appellate court. It is well-established that the High Court can interfere in second appeals only if there is a substantial error or defect in the procedure or if the decision is contrary to law. The High Court cannot interfere merely because it disagrees with the findings of fact unless those findings are unsupported by any evidence or are perverse. 2. Validity and Binding Nature of the Release Deed The release deed executed on September 26, 1938, by Respondent No. 2 in favor of the appellants was a central issue. The trial court found that the release deed was "brought about under fraudulent and mistaken circumstances" and was not binding on Respondent No. 1. However, the lower appellate court reversed this finding, holding that the settlement was not done in haste and there was no intention to defraud. The High Court, in its second appeal, sided with the trial court, but this was challenged as being beyond its jurisdiction under Section 100. 3. Allegations of Fraud and Lack of Independent Advice Respondent No. 1 alleged that Respondent No. 2, who had just attained majority, was imposed upon and lacked independent advice when executing the release deed. The trial court supported this view, but the lower appellate court found that Respondent No. 2 had adequate advice from family members and a respectable merchant, Sama Ayyar. The High Court's agreement with the trial court's view was questioned for not being supported by substantial procedural defects as required under Section 100. 4. Limitation Period for Filing the Suit The issue of whether the suit filed by Respondent No. 1 was barred by limitation was also significant. The lower appellate court held that the suit was barred by limitation under Section 7 of the Limitation Act. The High Court, however, disagreed, stating that Respondent No. 1 was not merely asking for accounts but was seeking a declaration that the release deed was not binding on him. Conclusion: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's decree and restoring the decree of the lower appellate court. It was held that the High Court had overstepped its jurisdiction under Section 100 by interfering with the findings of fact recorded by the lower appellate court. The findings of the lower appellate court were supported by evidence and were neither perverse nor unsupported by any evidence. The appeal was allowed with costs throughout.
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