9911796707
|
Home
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the declaration under Section 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. 2. Impact of the lease agreement on land acquisition proceedings. 3. Effect of the decree for specific performance on land acquisition proceedings. 4. Applicability of the proviso to Section 6(1) regarding the three-year period for issuing a declaration. 5. Relevance of the Explanation to Section 6(1) of the Act. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Validity of the Declaration under Section 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act The appellant challenged the declaration under Section 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, issued on 3-12-1983, on the grounds that it was void and illegal as it was made beyond the period of three years as contemplated by the proviso to Section 6(1) of the Act. The court, however, upheld the validity of the declaration, relying on the Full Bench decision in Chinnathambi Gounder v. Govt. of Tamil Nadu, which held that a subsequent declaration under Section 6(1) need not be made within three years if the original declaration was quashed by a court order. 2. Impact of the Lease Agreement on Land Acquisition Proceedings The appellant argued that the State Government could not proceed with the land acquisition while the lease agreement executed on 20-8-1980 was in force. The court found no merit in this contention, stating that the lease agreement between the appellant and the Corporation did not affect the statutory powers of the State Government under the Land Acquisition Act. The court clarified that the Land Acquisition proceedings are independent of any lease agreements and the interim order of injunction did not survive after the decision of the suit. 3. Effect of the Decree for Specific Performance on Land Acquisition Proceedings The appellant contended that the decree for specific performance against the Corporation rendered the land acquisition proceedings ineffective. The court rejected this argument, emphasizing that the decree for specific performance was only against the Corporation and did not bind the State Government. The court further noted that the appellant's subsequent suit to quash the land acquisition proceedings indicated that the decree for specific performance did not automatically invalidate the land acquisition. 4. Applicability of the Proviso to Section 6(1) Regarding the Three-Year Period for Issuing a Declaration The appellant argued that the declaration under Section 6(1) was invalid as it was issued beyond the three-year period from the notification under Section 4(1). The court held that the proviso to Section 6(1) did not apply in cases where the original declaration was quashed by a court order. The court explained that the proviso only required the initial declaration to be made within three years, and a fresh declaration could be issued beyond this period if the original was quashed. 5. Relevance of the Explanation to Section 6(1) of the Act The appellant contended that the Explanation to Section 6(1), which allows the exclusion of the period during which proceedings are stayed by a court order, did not apply. The court agreed that the Explanation was not relevant in this case since it pertains to the period during which proceedings are held up due to a stay or injunction, not to the quashing of a declaration. The court concluded that the Explanation did not affect the validity of the fresh declaration issued on 3-12-1983. Conclusion The court dismissed the appeal, upholding the validity of the declaration under Section 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. The court clarified that the lease agreement and the decree for specific performance did not impact the State Government's statutory powers under the Act. The court also ruled that the proviso to Section 6(1) regarding the three-year period did not apply to fresh declarations issued after the original was quashed. The pending appeal before the Subordinate Judge, Tuticorin, concerning the notification under Section 4(1), was directed to be disposed of before 31st August 1986. The application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was rejected.
|
