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Issues Involved:
1. Authority of the Receiver to dispossess the appellant. 2. Continuation of the Receiver's powers post-final decree. 3. Legality of dispossessing the appellant without a suit. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Authority of the Receiver to Dispossess the Appellant: The appellant contended that the Receiver had no power to dispossess him in a manner that prevented him from working his flour mill. The court examined the relevant orders and found that the Civil Judge initially appointed two joint Receivers by an order dated May 21, 1949. The High Court modified this order on August 22, 1949, confining the Receivers' appointment to the share of Messrs. John & Co. The Civil Judge later directed the Receivers to take possession of the appellant's share in the mills by an order dated December 1, 1951. The High Court's order on August 22, 1949, stated that a Receiver should be appointed to protect and preserve the property of defendants 1st set, but they could not interfere with the running of the mills except under express orders of the court. The Civil Judge's order on December 1, 1951, extended the Receivers' authority to the share of defendants 2nd set, including the appellant's share, for preservation and protection purposes. The preliminary decree on April 5, 1954, directed the Receivers to continue on the property until discharged. The High Court's compromise order on July 22, 1955, allowed the mills to be run by different parties under lease agreements approved by the court. The Receiver executed a lease in favor of the appellant on January 14, 1956, with an agreement to deliver the premises back to the Receiver upon expiry. The court concluded that the Receiver was legally in possession of the entire property, including the appellant's flour mill, and had the authority to take possession after the lease expired. 2. Continuation of the Receiver's Powers Post-Final Decree: The appellant argued that the Receiver's powers ceased after the final decree. The court examined the legal principles regarding the duration of a Receiver's appointment. According to authoritative texts, a Receiver appointed without a defined tenure continues until discharged by the court. The preliminary decree expressly directed the Receivers to continue until discharged, and the final decree did not modify this direction. The court held that the Receivers continued to function in their capacity until formally discharged, as the suit had not been finally disposed of since the plaintiff was entitled to seek a personal decree if the sale proceeds were insufficient. 3. Legality of Dispossessing the Appellant Without a Suit: The appellant contended that he could only be dispossessed through a regular suit, not a summary procedure. The court noted that under Order XL, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a Receiver is an officer of the court and can remove any person from possession or custody of the property. The appellant was a party to the suit and had executed a lease with an express condition to redeliver the property to the Receiver upon expiry. The court directed the Receiver to take possession of the mill after the lease term expired. The court cited relevant case law, including *Krista Chandra Ghose v. Krista Sakha Ghose*, which held that a lessee could not be summarily evicted unless the lease deed conferred a right of re-entry. However, the court distinguished this case, noting that the appellant was in possession under a compromise scheme for running the mills, and the Receiver was acting under court orders. The court concluded that it was legally competent to direct the Receiver to recover the property from the appellant without a regular suit. Conclusion: The court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Receiver had the authority to dispossess the appellant, the Receiver's powers continued post-final decree until formally discharged, and the court could summarily direct the Receiver to take possession of the property. The appeal was dismissed with costs.
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