2008 (9) TMI 610 - HC - Central Excise

Offence under Section 9 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 - revision petition - Revisional Court had considered in detail the submissions made by the petitioners to see if deletion of penalty against the petitioners by the Appellate Tribunal would amount to their acquittal in criminal complaint, leading to dropping of the criminal proceedings against them Held that - Criminal Court has to judge the case independently on the basis of evidence placed before it. It will be rather inappropriate for the Court to come to a conclusion on the basis of an assessment made by any authority otherwise under the Act, setting-aside of penalty proceedings by the Tribunal against the assessee did not bar the prosecution for an offence under Section 276(c) and 277 of the Income Tax Act, these aspects are required to be physically proved by leading relevant evidence. It would not be appropriate to quash the proceedings only on this ground, petitioners apparently have not raised any such plea before the Court at the time of framing charge, Once charges have been framed during pendency of the quashing proceedings, the petitioners have to challenge the order framing charges for getting any effective relief and against such an order revision would be maintainable. The petitioners have not done so, quashing petition, under these circumstances, can not be held maintainable, petition is accordingly dismissed

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Quashing of complaint and summoning order.
2. Delay in proceedings.
3. Impact of Tribunal's exoneration on criminal proceedings.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Quashing of Complaint and Summoning Order:
The petitioners sought to quash the complaint dated 5-5-1981 and the summoning order dated 5-5-1988 under Section 9 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. They also sought to quash the order dated 4-2-2005 by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ludhiana, which declined their discharge despite their exoneration by the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi. The petitioners' revision against this order before the Additional Sessions Judge, Ludhiana, was dismissed, leading to the current consolidated petition.

2. Delay in Proceedings:
The case has been pending since 1988, with numerous adjournments causing a delay of 19 years. The Court noted that the Trial Court allowed the case to drift endlessly without proper control. The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ludhiana, provided detailed reasons for the adjournments, citing non-availability of witnesses, records, counsel, and various other reasons including strikes and holidays. Despite these reasons, the Court found that the Judicial Officers exercised no effective control over the proceedings, leading to an unacceptable state of affairs. However, the Court also noted that the petitioners contributed to the delay by seeking adjournments and exemptions, and obtaining stays of proceedings.

3. Impact of Tribunal's Exoneration on Criminal Proceedings:
The petitioners argued that their exoneration by the Tribunal should lead to the quashing of the criminal proceedings. They cited several judgments, including G.L. Didwania v. Income Tax Officer and others, to support their claim. However, the Court held that the criminal court must independently judge the case based on evidence presented before it, and the result of proceedings under the Act would not bind the criminal court. The Court referred to P. Jayappan v. S.K. Peruman and Commissioner of Income-tax v. Kalyan Das Rastogi, emphasizing that civil obligations like penalties are different from criminal penalties. The Court concluded that the petitioners must raise these pleas before the Trial Court, and the quashing petition was not maintainable without challenging the order framing charges.

Conclusion:
The petition was dismissed, with the Court directing that the matter be placed before the present Hon'ble Administrative Judge of Session Division Ludhiana for appropriate action against the Judicial Officers responsible for the delay. The Court rejected the petitioners' grounds for quashing the proceedings, holding them equally responsible for the delay and noting that they had not initially raised the delay as a ground for quashing. The petitioners were advised to raise their pleas before the Trial Court.