2011 (1) TMI 1195 - HC - VAT and Sales Tax

Writ petition delay in filing appeal - appeal was rejected on the ground that the said appeal, filed with a delay of 528 days, could not be admitted Held that - Section 31(1) of the VAT Act, and its first proviso, prescribe a maximum period of 60 days (3,0 30) for an appeal tp be entertained by the appellate authority, and not beyond. As the right of appeal conferred by the VAT Act is subject to the restrictions prescribed therein, and as the delay in the present case of 528 days is far in excess of the maximum period of 60 days within which alone can the appellate authority entertain an appeal under section 31(1), the principle of ubi jus ibi remedium has no application, writ petition fails and is, accordingly, dismissed

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Rejection of the petitioner's appeal due to delay.
2. Applicability of the Limitation Act to the VAT Act.
3. Discretionary power of the appellate authority to condone delays.
4. Doctrine of precedence of substantive rights over procedural law.
5. Principle of actus curiae neminem gravabit.
6. Ubi jus ibi remedium principle.
7. Jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Rejection of the Petitioner's Appeal Due to Delay:
The petitioner's appeal under Section 31 of the Andhra Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2005 (VAT Act) was rejected due to a delay of 528 days. The appellate authority held that it had no power to condone such a delay beyond 60 days as per the statute.

2. Applicability of the Limitation Act to the VAT Act:
The court referenced the Supreme Court's judgment in Parson Tools and Plants [1975] 35 STC 413 (SC), which established that if a special statute prescribes a specific period of limitation and explicitly limits the extension period, the tribunal cannot extend this period by applying Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act. This principle was upheld despite the Supreme Court's later ruling in Mukri Gapalan v. Cheppilat Puthanpurayil Aboobacker AIR 1995 SC 2272, which distinguished the earlier judgment on different grounds.

3. Discretionary Power of the Appellate Authority to Condon Delays:
The court examined the legislative intent behind the VAT Act and its predecessor, the APGST Act. The amendments to the APGST Act, which introduced a cap on the discretionary power to condone delays, were intended to streamline the appeal process and curtail prolonged litigation. The court concluded that the appellate authority under the VAT Act could only condone delays up to a maximum of 60 days (30 + 30 days).

4. Doctrine of Precedence of Substantive Rights Over Procedural Law:
The petitioner argued that their substantive right to appeal should take precedence over procedural limitations. However, the court held that the right of appeal is a statutory creation and can be circumscribed by conditions imposed by the Legislature. Therefore, the doctrine of precedence of substantive rights over procedural law did not apply in this case.

5. Principle of Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit:
The petitioner contended that the period during which their writ petition was pending should be excluded based on the principle that the act of the court shall prejudice no one. The court rejected this argument, stating that the writ petition was dismissed at the admission stage, and no directions were issued to exclude the period of its pendency.

6. Ubi Jus Ibi Remedium Principle:
The petitioner invoked the principle of ubi jus ibi remedium, arguing that a right must have a remedy. The court dismissed this argument, stating that the substantive right of appeal is subject to statutory limitations, and the excessive delay of 528 days far exceeded the permissible limit.

7. Jurisdiction of the High Court Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India:
The court emphasized that the period of limitation prescribed by a statute should not ordinarily be extended by the High Court under Article 226. The court also noted that it could not issue directions to the appellate authority to entertain an appeal beyond the statutory period. The earlier dismissal of the writ petition did not confer any right on the petitioner to claim exclusion of the period of pendency.

Conclusion:
The writ petition was dismissed, with the court holding that the appellate authority under the VAT Act had no power to condone a delay beyond 60 days. The court upheld the statutory limitations and rejected the petitioner's arguments based on various legal doctrines and principles. The decision reinforced the legislative intent to streamline the appeal process and limit the discretionary power to condone delays.