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Issues:
Scope of appeal under section 246 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 against best judgment assessment under section 144 without resorting to section 146 for reopening assessment. Analysis: The High Court was presented with a reference from the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal regarding the correctness of an assessment made under section 144 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The controversy revolved around the failure of the assessee to produce bank pass books and account books in response to a notice under section 142(1) of the Act. The Income-tax Officer completed a best judgment assessment under section 144, estimating the income of the assessee. The Commissioner of Income tax (Appeals) set aside the assessment, leading to appeals by both the Revenue and the assessee to the Tribunal. The Tribunal upheld the assessment under section 144, stating that the assessee's failure to produce the required documents justified the assessment. The Tribunal also ruled that the Commissioner could not question the validity of the notice under section 142(1) as the assessee had not applied for reopening the assessment under section 146. The core issue in this case was the scope of appeal under section 246 of the Act against an assessment made under section 144 without utilizing the provisions of section 146 for reopening the assessment. The court examined section 146(1) which allows an assessee to apply for the cancellation of an assessment under section 144 under specific grounds. The court noted that despite the assessee's claims that the bank pass books were in possession of the Income-tax Officer, he did not invoke section 146 for reopening the assessment. The court highlighted that an appeal under section 246(1)(c) against an order under section 144 is limited to challenging the quantum of income, tax, loss, or status of the assessee, not the validity of notices. The court referenced past judgments to support its decision. It cited Gopal Singh v. CIT, where it was held that challenging the validity of a notice under section 142(1) without resorting to section 146 is not permissible. Similar views were expressed in Gaurishanker Kedia v. CIT and H. S. Imam v. CIT, emphasizing the importance of utilizing section 146 before challenging assessments. The court also mentioned CIT v. Pearl Mechanical Engineering and Foundry Works (P.) Ltd., where it was ruled that an appeal against a best judgment assessment under section 144 is not maintainable without first appealing against an order under section 146 refusing to cancel the assessment. In conclusion, the court affirmed that an assessee must use section 146 or appeal against an order under section 146 to challenge the validity of notices under section 142(1) and cannot do so in an appeal under section 246(1)(c) against an assessment under section 144 without resorting to section 146. The judgment was in favor of the Tribunal's decision, highlighting the importance of following proper procedures in challenging assessments.
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