2014 (11) TMI 451 - HC - Central Excise

Condonation of delay - Section 5 and section 14 of Limitation Act - it appears that the respondent presented the appeal before the Tribunal at the first instance, within 60 days. On being informed that the appeal lies to the Commissioner (Appeals), it was presented there on 09.10.2006. By that time, 5 months i.e. 150 days computed from the date of furnishing of the order expired. The Commissioner took the view that the appeal must be presented within 60 days and since there is delay of 92 days, it cannot be entertained. Held that - The scope of applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act to the proceedings under the Act was never in doubt. The record of this case clearly discloses that if the period during which the proceedings were pending before the Tribunal at the first instance the appeal would be within limitation when presented before the Commissioner. The Tribunal made a specific reference to Section 14 of the Limitation Act. We do not find any basis to interfere with the passed by the Tribunal - Decided against Revenue.

Issues Involved:
1. Applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act to the proceedings under the Central Excise Act.
2. Power of the Commissioner (Appeals) to condone delay beyond the prescribed period.
3. Interpretation of Section 35 of the Central Excise Act concerning limitation and condonation of delay.
4. Exclusion of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act in proceedings under the Central Excise Act.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act:
The respondent, a manufacturer of goods subject to excise duty and cess, faced a demand order dated 23.03.2006. After receiving the order on 09.05.2006, the respondent initially filed an appeal before the Tribunal, which was deemed improper, leading to a subsequent appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) on 09.10.2006. The Tribunal allowed the appeal, granting the benefit under Section 14 of the Limitation Act for the period spent pursuing the remedy before the Tribunal. The court upheld this view, stating that the period during which the proceedings were pending before the Tribunal should be excluded, thereby making the appeal timely when presented before the Commissioner.

2. Power of the Commissioner (Appeals) to Condon Delay:
The Commissioner (Appeals) refused to entertain the appeal on the grounds of limitation, computing the period from the date of furnishing the copy (09.05.2006) to the date of appeal presentation (09.10.2006), resulting in a 92-day delay. The court noted that Section 35(1) of the Act provides a 60-day period for appeal presentation, with a possible 30-day extension for sufficient cause. However, the court emphasized that the exclusion of time under Section 14 of the Limitation Act is mandatory and not subject to the discretion of the Commissioner.

3. Interpretation of Section 35 of the Central Excise Act:
Section 35 of the Act prescribes a 60-day period for filing appeals before the Commissioner (Appeals), extendable by 30 days. The court highlighted the inconsistency within the Act regarding the limitation periods for different appeals: 60 days for the Commissioner (Appeals) with a 30-day extension, 90 days for the Tribunal with unrestricted condonation, and 180 days for the High Court with no condonation allowed. The court reiterated that Section 14 of the Limitation Act, which mandates the exclusion of time spent pursuing a remedy in a wrong forum, should be applied, thus supporting the Tribunal's decision.

4. Exclusion of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act:
The appellant argued that Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act are excluded in proceedings under the Central Excise Act, citing Supreme Court judgments in Singh Enterprises, Hongo India Private Limited, and Amchong Tea Estate. However, the court distinguished between the condonation of delay under Section 5 and the exclusion of time under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. It clarified that while Section 5's applicability might be restricted, Section 14's exclusion of time is a statutory mandate not subject to the Act's specific provisions. The court referred to the Supreme Court's judgment in Vidyacharan Shukla, which supported the applicability of Section 14 unless expressly excluded by the special enactment.

Conclusion:
The court dismissed the appeal, affirming the Tribunal's decision to allow the appeal based on the exclusion of time under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. It emphasized that the Limitation Act's provisions, particularly Section 14, are applicable unless explicitly excluded by the special law, which was not the case here. The court highlighted the mandatory nature of time exclusion under Section 14, ensuring the appeal was within the limitation period when presented before the Commissioner.

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