2015 (4) TMI 114 - HC - Customs

Condonation of delay - Inordinate delay of 1346 days - Power of Commissioner to condone delay u/s 128 - Held that - the appeal has been filed with a delay of 1346 days. It is to be noted that the proviso to Section 128 (1) enables the Commissioner (Appeals) permits the filing of the appeal beyond the sixty days provided that he is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the appeal within the sixty days prescribed. In fact, while exercising such discretionary power, the authority can condone the delay upto 90 days on sufficient cause shown by the petitioner for not filing the appeal in time. The present appeal was beyond the statutory period of 90 days and the authority has rightly rejected the same, since he cannot be expected to exercise his discretionary power beyond the permissible period that was prescribed by the statute. - Decided against assessee.

Summary

Issues:
1. Appeal against Order-in-Original demanding payment of duty and interest.
2. Delay in filing appeal under Section 128 of the Customs Act.
3. Power of High Court to condone delay beyond statutory period.

Analysis:
1. The petitioner filed writ petitions challenging an Order-in-Original demanding payment of duty and interest, along with a notice for the same. The petitioner had obtained an EPCG License for duty-free import of capital goods but faced demands despite fulfilling export obligations and obtaining a redemption letter. The appeal against the order was dismissed due to a delay of 1346 days in filing the appeal, leading to the present challenge.

2. Section 128 of the Customs Act governs appeals to the Commissioner (Appeals) against decisions or orders. The provision allows for a 60-day period for filing an appeal, extendable by a further 30 days at the discretion of the Commissioner (Appeals) on showing sufficient cause. However, the appeal in this case was filed beyond the statutory period of 90 days, and the authority rightly rejected it, as discretion to condone the delay is limited to the prescribed period.

3. The High Court examined the power to condone delay beyond the statutory period in light of relevant legal precedents. Referring to decisions in similar contexts, the Court emphasized that the Customs Act is a complete code, independent of the Limitation Act. The Court held that the nature of the remedy provided under the Customs Act indicates a legislative intent for it to be a self-sufficient framework. Consequently, the Court concluded that the delay beyond the statutory period cannot be condoned, aligning with the Supreme Court's rulings on similar matters.

In conclusion, the High Court dismissed the writ petitions, citing the exclusivity of the Customs Act as a self-contained legal framework and the inability to condone delays beyond the statutory period. The Court's decision was based on a thorough analysis of the relevant legal provisions and established precedents, emphasizing the self-sufficiency of the Customs Act in matters of appeals and limitations.