2015 (9) TMI 725 - HC - Central Excise

Condonation of delay - delay in appeal filed before the commissioner (appeals) - exclusion of period spent in pursuing writ remedy before HC - writ was dismissed by the HC earlier for want of jurisdiction - Held that - Prima-facie Section 14 of the Limitation Act 1963 is not applicable because there was no want of jurisdiction where the writ petition was preferred. Normally, the assesses are taking a chance by filing a matter directly in the High Court which is always at the peril and risk of the petitioner, specially when delay is not condonable. This petitioner is not exception to chance taking petitioner. This aspects of the matter have been taken care of by deciding the matters in terms of reported decisions as stated hereinabove. Hence, this writ petition may not be entertained by this Court. - no error has been committed by the Commissioner (Appeals) in passing order - Decided against assessee.

Issues Involved:
1. Whether the Commissioner (Appeals) erred in dismissing the appeals due to delay beyond the condonable period.
2. Applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for condonation of delay.
3. Whether the petitioner can claim exclusion of time spent in writ petitions for computing the delay.
4. Jurisdiction and authority of Commissioner (Appeals) under Section 85(3A) of the Finance Act, 1994.
5. Legal precedents and their applicability to the present case.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Dismissal of Appeals Due to Delay Beyond Condonable Period:
The petitioner challenged the order dated 16th October 2014 by the Commissioner (Appeals) dismissing the appeals on the grounds of delay beyond the condonable period. The appeals were filed approximately 16 months after the original order dated 31st December 2012 by the Additional Commissioner of Central Excise, Ranchi. The Commissioner (Appeals) has no authority to condone delays beyond 30 days past the initial 60 days as per Section 85(3A) of the Finance Act, 1994.

2. Applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963:
The petitioner argued for the applicability of Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, which allows for the exclusion of time spent in bona fide legal proceedings in a court without jurisdiction. However, the court found that Section 14 was not applicable as the writ petition was filed after the limitation period for appeal had already expired. Furthermore, the writ petition was not pursued in a court lacking jurisdiction.

3. Exclusion of Time Spent in Writ Petitions:
The petitioner sought to exclude the time spent in various writ petitions for computing the delay in filing the appeal. The court noted that the writ petition (T) No. 7713 of 2013 was filed on 17th December 2013 and dismissed on 25th March 2014, well after the limitation period had expired. The court emphasized that filing writ petitions at one's own risk does not entitle the petitioner to an extension of the statutory appeal period.

4. Jurisdiction and Authority of Commissioner (Appeals):
The court reiterated that the Commissioner (Appeals) has limited jurisdiction under Section 85(3A) of the Finance Act, 1994, to condone delays only up to 30 days beyond the initial 60-day appeal period. The statutory framework does not permit condonation beyond this period, as affirmed by the Supreme Court in Singh Enterprises vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jamshedpur.

5. Legal Precedents and Applicability:
The petitioner relied on various judgments, including those from the Supreme Court and the Gujarat High Court, to argue for the condonation of delay. However, the court found these precedents inapplicable to the present case. The Supreme Court's decision in Singh Enterprises clearly delineates the non-applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation beyond the statutory period. Additionally, the Bombay High Court's judgment in similar cases further supported the position that statutory limitations must be strictly adhered to.

Conclusion:
The court concluded that the Commissioner (Appeals) did not err in dismissing the appeals due to the delay being beyond the condonable period. The petitioner's reliance on Section 14 of the Limitation Act was misplaced, as the writ petition was filed after the appeal period had already expired. The court dismissed the writ petition, reaffirming the necessity for petitioners to adhere to statutory timelines and not rely on writ petitions to circumvent established limitations.

← Previous Next →