1975 (3) TMI 145 - HC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Jurisdiction of the Commission to inquire into the succession of Nawab Salar Jung III's estate.
2. Validity and enforceability of the agreement dated 27-6-1952 between the plaintiff and Sajjid Yar Jung.
3. Abatement of the appeal due to non-service of notices to certain respondents.
4. Public policy considerations surrounding the agreement.
5. Plaintiff's entitlement to the return of advanced amounts.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Jurisdiction of the Commission to Inquire into the Succession of Nawab Salar Jung III's Estate:
The Nizam of Hyderabad appointed a Commission on 31-5-1949 to inquire into the succession of Nawab Salar Jung III's estate. The High Court of Hyderabad, in its judgment dated 23-9-1952, held that the Commission was not the proper forum to determine the question of succession. The High Court directed that the estate's management remain with the Salar Jung Estate Committee until the question of succession was settled by a Civil Court. The succession was eventually settled by a compromise embodied in the decree passed in O.S. 13/58.

2. Validity and Enforceability of the Agreement Dated 27-6-1952:
The plaintiff claimed that Sajjid Yar Jung approached him for financial help to establish his claim to the estate. An agreement was executed on 27-6-1952, where Sajjid Yar Jung promised to return the advanced amounts and give the plaintiff a one-anna share in the estate. The City Civil Court found the agreement true and admissible in evidence. However, it was held unenforceable as it was "opposed to public policy" and "unconscionable," with the agreement's object being to influence Central and State Ministers.

3. Abatement of the Appeal Due to Non-service of Notices to Certain Respondents:
During the appeal, Askar Nawaz Jung, the 1st defendant, died. Notices to some of his legal representatives were returned unserved. The court dismissed the appeal against the 1st respondent due to non-compliance with the order to file fresh batta with correct addresses. The court held that the appeal had abated against the 1st respondent and could not proceed against the other respondents either, as their interests were the same, and success against the remaining respondents would lead to contradictory decisions.

4. Public Policy Considerations Surrounding the Agreement:
The court emphasized that the agreement's object was to influence Ministers, which is against public policy. The court cited various precedents, including Montefoire v. Menday Motor Components Co. Ltd., to support the view that agreements tending to influence public servants are injurious to public interest and, therefore, void. The court stressed that public policy must evolve with changing social values and that agreements with a tendency to corrupt public service are contrary to public policy.

5. Plaintiff's Entitlement to the Return of Advanced Amounts:
The plaintiff argued for the return of the advanced amounts with interest, citing cases like Husain Bakhsh v. Rahmat Husain and Venkataswamy v. Nagi Reddy. However, the court held that the agreement was not merely champertous but aimed to influence Ministers, making the entire agreement void. Consequently, the plaintiff was not entitled to recover the advanced amounts.

Conclusion:
The court upheld the judgment and decree of the lower court, dismissing the appeal with costs. The agreement was found to be opposed to public policy and unenforceable, and the appeal was dismissed due to abatement against the 1st respondent. The plaintiff's claim for the return of advanced amounts was also denied.