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1994 (7) TMI 365 - HC - Indian Laws

Issues Involved:
1. Legitimacy of the hoarding erection permission granted by the State Government.
2. Ownership of the land where the hoarding was erected.
3. Applicability of Section 5-A of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971.
4. Classification of the hoarding as movable or immovable property.
5. Requirement of notice before removal of the hoarding.
6. Entitlement to compensation for the removal of the hoarding.
7. Applicability of principles of natural justice.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Legitimacy of the hoarding erection permission granted by the State Government:
The first respondent was granted permission by the State Government to erect hoardings on National Highway 45. However, the appellants contended that the land belonged to the Defence Department and no permission was granted by them. The court observed that the State Government's order did not specify the exact locations or survey numbers, and there was no evidence that the State Government had the right to deal with the land.

2. Ownership of the land where the hoarding was erected:
The appellants argued that the land belonged to the Defence Department, supported by their land register. The first respondent had previously erected a hoarding at the same location in 1992, which was removed after a warning from the military authorities. The court noted that the question of title to the property involved rival claims between the State Government and the Defence Department, which could not be decided in writ proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

3. Applicability of Section 5-A of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971:
The appellants relied on Section 5-A(3) of the Act, which allows for the removal of movable structures without notice. The first respondent contended that the hoarding was an immovable property, and the procedure under Section 5-A(2) should have been followed. The court analyzed the provisions of Section 5-A and concluded that the hoarding was a movable structure, falling under Section 5-A(3).

4. Classification of the hoarding as movable or immovable property:
The court referred to various legal definitions and tests to determine whether the hoarding was movable or immovable. It concluded that the hoarding, being erected on iron pillars embedded in the earth, could be removed without injury to its quality. Therefore, it was classified as a movable property.

5. Requirement of notice before removal of the hoarding:
Under Section 5-A(3), the removal of movable structures does not require notice. The court held that the appellants acted within their legal rights by removing the hoarding without notice, as it was classified as a movable structure.

6. Entitlement to compensation for the removal of the hoarding:
The first respondent claimed to have spent Rs. 1 lakh on erecting the hoarding and sought compensation. However, the court found no evidence to support this claim and deemed the compensation awarded by the learned single Judge as erroneous.

7. Applicability of principles of natural justice:
The first respondent argued for the application of natural justice principles, asserting that an opportunity should have been given before the removal of the hoarding. The court, however, observed that the legislature deliberately excluded natural justice principles in cases of unauthorized movable structures on public premises to facilitate quick removal.

Conclusion:
The writ appeal was allowed, the order of the learned single Judge was set aside, and the writ petition was dismissed. The court held that the procedure adopted by the appellants was in accordance with law, and no mandamus could be issued in favor of the first respondent. Additionally, the court ruled that the first respondent was not entitled to compensation, and the principles of natural justice did not apply in this context. The first respondent was ordered to pay the costs of the writ appeal to the appellants.

 

 

 

 

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