2001 (8) TMI 1428 - SC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:

1. Availability of the plea of limitation in the matter of execution of a decree.
2. Interpretation of Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
3. Interaction between the Limitation Act and the Indian Stamp Act, 1899.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Availability of the plea of limitation in the matter of execution of a decree:

The primary issue in this appeal is the availability of the plea of limitation in the execution of a decree. The term "execution" is derived from the Latin "ex sequi," meaning to follow out or perform, and refers to the process of enforcing or giving effect to a court judgment. The judgment references Lord Denning's interpretation, which states that execution is completed when the judgment creditor receives the awarded money or property.

2. Interpretation of Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963:

Article 136 prescribes a twelve-year period for the execution of a decree, starting from when the decree becomes enforceable. The legislative intent is to provide a twelve-year certain period from the date of the decree. The judgment references the Law Commission's recommendation, which emphasized that the maximum period for executing a decree should be twelve years from when it becomes enforceable. The factual background involves a preliminary decree passed on 8.6.1969 and a final decree on 20.11.1970. The decree-holder failed to furnish the required stamp paper, resulting in a delay in drafting the decree. The court held that the period of limitation starts from when the decree becomes enforceable, not when the stamp paper is furnished. The judgment emphasizes that one cannot take advantage of their own wrong to extend the limitation period.

3. Interaction between the Limitation Act and the Indian Stamp Act, 1899:

The judgment addresses the argument that a partition decree is also an instrument of partition under Section 2(15) of the Indian Stamp Act, which requires it to be duly stamped to be acted upon. The court held that the enforceability of a decree under Article 136 of the Limitation Act is not suspended by the requirement of furnishing stamp paper under the Stamp Act. The judgment clarifies that the period of limitation cannot be kept in abeyance by an enactment unrelated to the Limitation Act. The court concluded that the enforceability of a decree is distinct from its executability, and the twelve-year limitation period starts from when the decree is passed, not when it is stamped.

Conclusion:

The court dismissed the appeal, holding that the twelve-year limitation period for executing a decree begins from the date the decree becomes enforceable, irrespective of the delay in furnishing stamp paper. The interaction between the Limitation Act and the Stamp Act does not affect the commencement of the limitation period. The judgment reinforces that legislative intent and statutory provisions must be interpreted to avoid absurdities and uphold the principle of legal diligence.