9911796707
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Issues:
1. Challenge to the legality and validity of an order issued under the Wealth Tax Act, 1957. 2. Preliminary objection raised regarding the appealability of the order under section 26 of the Act. 3. Bar on interference by the court under article 226 due to the availability of statutory appeal unless exceptional circumstances exist. 4. Consideration of the limitation period for filing an appeal and the power of the Appellate Tribunal to condone delays. 5. Dismissal of the petition due to the availability of an alternative remedy through the statutory appeal process. Analysis: The judgment concerns a petition challenging the legality and validity of an order issued under the Wealth Tax Act, 1957. The Wealth Tax Officer (WTO) had made three references to the Valuation Officer, resulting in an order under section 25(2) setting aside the assessments and directing a revision based on the Valuation Officer's estimate. The petitioner contended that the impugned order was appealable under section 26 of the Act, and therefore, the court should not interfere under article 226 unless exceptional circumstances existed. The court held that since a statutory appeal was available to the aggrieved party, interference under article 226 was not warranted unless exceptional circumstances were demonstrated. The petitioner's argument that the appeal would be time-barred was acknowledged, but the court highlighted the Appellate Tribunal's power to admit appeals filed beyond the limitation period if sufficient cause was shown. The petitioner had chosen to file a petition under article 226 instead of appealing to the Tribunal, which the court deemed a fit case for condoning the delay in filing the appeal, provided the appeal was filed by a specified date. As the court upheld the preliminary objection regarding the availability of an appeal, it declined to delve into the merits of the contentions raised by the petitioner. The judgment emphasized that the petitioner could raise all arguments against the impugned order in the likely appeal under section 26 of the Act. Consequently, the petition was dismissed not on its merits but due to the existence of an alternative remedy through the statutory appeal process. The rule was discharged, and no costs were awarded in the circumstances.
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