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Issues Involved:
1. Legislative Intent 2. Judicial Function 3. Interpretative Exercise 4. Argument of Consequence 5. Jurisprudential Principle Detailed Analysis: 1. Legislative Intent: The Court's role is to ascertain the true intention of Parliament when enacting a statute and interpret it to advance such legislative intent. The judgment notes that the Parliament accepted the view in Velliappa Textiles Ltd. & Anr., which interpreted the prosecution under Sections 276C, 277, and 278 read with Section 278B of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The judgment in Velliappa was delivered on 16th September 2003, and Section 278B was promptly amended by Parliament with the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2004, effective from 1.10.2004, to include sub-section (3), allowing companies to be punished with fines. This amendment indicates Parliament's agreement with the majority view in Velliappa, highlighting the legislative intent to resolve the difficulty identified by the Court. 2. Judicial Function: The Court's function is to interpret the law, not to make it. The maxim "judicis est just dicere, non dare" emphasizes that the Court should interpret the law rather than create it. The judgment criticizes judicial heroics, which involve the Court remedying legislative errors by presuming the legislature's intention. The Court should declare the legislation's shortcomings, prompting the legislature to amend the law, as seen in the present case. The judgment disapproves of the approach suggested by Denning L.J. in Seaford Court Estates Ltd. vs. Asher, which was criticized by the House of Lords in Magor & St. Mellons R.D.C. v. Newport Corporation and cited with approval by the Supreme Court in Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Ltd. vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court. 3. Interpretative Exercise: The judgment rejects the argument that the Court can read "imprisonment and fine" as "imprisonment or fine." Such a construction would amount to rewriting the section and applying different meanings based on circumstances, which is impermissible. The statute's plain terms mandate imprisonment and fine, leaving no option for the Court to impose only a fine in certain circumstances. The principle that punishment must follow conviction is emphasized, as seen in State of Maharashtra vs. Jugamander Lal and other cases. The judgment also rejects the argument that the Court can interpret the statute differently for corporate offenders, as this would involve legislative action, not judicial interpretation. 4. Argument of Consequence: The judgment addresses the argument that upholding the majority view in Velliappa would make it impossible to prosecute offenders under strict liability statutes. The Court's role is limited to finding solutions within specified parameters, and judicial heroics or legislative usurpation are not warranted. The argument that the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, allows the Court to stop short of actual punishment is opposed to established law, which mandates that sentence must follow conviction. 5. Jurisprudential Principle: The judgment refers to Kenny's "The Outlines of Criminal Law," which states that a corporation, being devoid of mind and body, cannot be subjected to usual criminal punishments like imprisonment. Corporate criminal liability requires legislative changes, such as imposing fines instead of imprisonment, as seen in other jurisdictions like Australia, France, Netherlands, and Belgium. The judgment emphasizes that the Court cannot interpret statutes to impose different punishments based on the offender's nature (natural or juristic person). The reliance on Section 48A of the Monopolies and Restricted Trade Practices Act, 1969, is dismissed as it does not advance the argument against the majority view in Velliappa. Conclusion: The judgment concludes that the majority view in Velliappa is correct and does not require reconsideration. The matters in the group should be placed before appropriate Benches for disposal in accordance with the law.
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