1984 (5) TMI 267 - HC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues:
Challenge against the Notification adding 'Timber' as 'Forest Produce' under the Rajasthan Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961.

Analysis:
1. The primary argument raised was whether 'Imarti Lakdi' (Timber) qualifies as agricultural produce under the Act. The petitioner contended that 'Imarti Lakdi' is a forest produce and cannot be considered agricultural produce as per the Act's definition. The respondent argued that the definition of 'agricultural produce' in the Act is exhaustive and includes forest products like timber. Reference was made to previous judgments, including M/s Raunaq Ram Tara Chand v. State of Punjab, where the Supreme Court held that processed products like Gur and Sakkar fall under agricultural produce, emphasizing the wide import of the definition.

2. Another case, Ram Chandra Kailash Kumar and Co. v. State of UP, was cited to support the interpretation that anything sold in the agricultural market is subject to market fee, irrespective of its origin. The petitioner distinguished this case by highlighting that the U.P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Act includes forest produce in its definition of agricultural produce, unlike the Rajasthan Act.

3. The petitioner relied on various judgments to argue that timber should not be classified as agricultural produce. Reference was made to Commissioner of Income Tax v. Benoy Kumar Sahas Roy, emphasizing that the term 'agriculture' encompasses all land products with utility for consumption or trade, including forest products. The petitioner also cited cases like M/s. Bhanwarlal Sohanlal v. State, emphasizing that Section 40 of the Act should be used in line with the Act's purpose.

4. The petitioner further relied on Eton Rural District Council v. River Thames Conservators to interpret the term 'otherwise' in the Act, suggesting that it should be construed according to the ejusdem generis rule. The judgment in M/s H. Paras Ram & Sons v. State of Rajasthan was cited to support the argument that the definition of 'agricultural produce' should be read as separate categories without applying the principle of ejusdem generis.

5. The final decision by the court upheld that timber (Imarti Lakdi) falls within the definition of agricultural produce under the Act. The court emphasized that the inclusion of timber in the Schedule by notification is within the legislative competence and aligns with the Act's provisions. The court also rejected the need for a judicial inquiry into whether timber qualifies as agricultural produce, as it is a notified item in the Schedule.

6. Ultimately, the court dismissed the challenge against the Notification adding 'Timber' as 'Forest Produce' under the Rajasthan Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961. No costs were awarded in the matter.