9911796707
|
Home
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the election petition filed by the respondent was tenable in law. 2. Whether the appellant held an office of profit under the Government, thereby disqualifying him from being elected as a Councillor. 3. Whether the High Court could declare the respondent as duly elected without holding a fresh election. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Tenability of the Election Petition: The appellant contended that the election petition filed by the respondent was misconceived and not tenable in law. The argument was based on the interpretation of Section 14 and Section 20 of the Mysore Town Municipalities Act, 1951. Section 14 deals with general disqualifications for becoming a Councillor and states that if a person is elected in contravention of these provisions, his seat shall be deemed vacant. The appellant argued that any dispute regarding disqualification should be decided by the Government, as per Section 14(3), and not through an election petition under Section 20. Section 20 outlines the procedure for challenging the validity of an election through an election petition, primarily addressing corrupt practices and irregularities in vote counting. The appellant asserted that the remedies under Sections 14 and 20 are mutually exclusive, and the respondent should have approached the Government for resolving the disqualification issue. 2. Office of Profit: The core issue was whether the appellant, as the Chairman of the Gubbi Taluk Development Committee, held an office of profit under the Government, thereby disqualifying him under Section 14(1)(A)(a)(iii) of the Act. The appellant received a fee of Rs. 6 per sitting, which the Sub-Judge deemed insufficient to constitute an office of profit. The High Court, however, reversed this decision, emphasizing the provision in the Mysore Legislature (Prevention of Disqualifications) Act, 1951, which exempts certain office holders from disqualification. The Supreme Court analyzed the nature of the fee and the duties of the Chairman, concluding that the fee was intended to cover out-of-pocket expenses and did not constitute a profit. The Court held that the appellant did not hold an office of profit and was therefore not disqualified from being elected as a Councillor. 3. Declaration of the Respondent as Duly Elected: The appellant argued that even if his election were set aside, the High Court should have ordered a fresh election rather than declaring the respondent as duly elected. However, this issue became moot following the Supreme Court's decision that the appellant was not disqualified and his election was valid. Consequently, the need for a fresh election or the declaration of the respondent as elected did not arise. Conclusion: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court, and restored the decision of the Sub-Judge, Tumkur. The Court held that the election petition was not the appropriate remedy for addressing the disqualification issue, which should be decided by the Government under Section 14(3). However, the appeal succeeded primarily on the ground that the appellant did not hold an office of profit under the Government, thereby validating his election. The appellant was awarded the costs of the appeal.
|
