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Issues Involved:
1. Starting point of limitation under Section 15 of the Indian Merchandise Marks Act. 2. Interpretation of "commission of the offence" in Section 15. 3. Whether a continuing offence affects the limitation period under Section 15. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Starting Point of Limitation under Section 15 of the Indian Merchandise Marks Act: The primary issue in this case is to determine the starting point of limitation under Section 15 of the Indian Merchandise Marks Act. The court was asked whether the limitation period begins from the specific instance of infringement specified in the charge or from the date of the first infringement or first discovery of infringement, whichever occurs first. The court concluded that the starting point of limitation under Section 15 is the date of the offence charged. This interpretation aligns with the plain meaning of the statute, which states that no prosecution shall commence after three years from the commission of the offence or one year after the first discovery thereof by the prosecutor, whichever expires first. 2. Interpretation of "Commission of the Offence" in Section 15: The court examined the phrase "commission of the offence" in Section 15 and determined that it refers to the specific offence for which the prosecution is launched. The court rejected the interpretation that it could mean the first offence in a series of continuing offences. The court emphasized that the literal meaning of the statute should be followed unless there is a compelling reason to deviate. The court noted that the Calcutta High Court had taken a similar view in Nagendranath Shaha v. Emperor, while the Madras High Court, Rangoon High Court, and a previous decision of the Bombay High Court in Abdulsatarkhan v. Ratanlal had adopted a different interpretation. 3. Whether a Continuing Offence Affects the Limitation Period under Section 15: The court addressed whether the concept of a continuing offence, similar to a continuing tort or breach of contract, affects the limitation period under Section 15. The court expressed doubt about treating trade mark infringement as a continuing offence for the purposes of limitation, given the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code regarding the framing and trial of charges. The court highlighted the practical difficulties and potential injustices that could arise from interpreting Section 15 to mean that the limitation period starts from the first infringement in a series of continuing offences. The court concluded that such an interpretation would require significant alteration of the statutory language and could lead to absurd results, such as conferring a prescriptive right to commit a criminal offence. Separate Judgments: S.S. Rangnekar, J.: Justice Rangnekar acknowledged the difficulties in interpreting Section 15 and discussed the implications of both possible constructions. He agreed with the majority view that the limitation period should start from the offence charged in the complaint. He emphasized that the object of the legislature must be gathered from the language of the statute and that adopting the first construction would be safer and more consistent with the statutory language. N.J. Wadia, J.: Justice Wadia concurred with the majority view, stating that the language of Section 15 clearly suggests that "the offence" refers to the offence charged. He noted that interpreting the section to mean the first offence in a series of continuing offences would require reading additional words into the statute, which is not permissible. He highlighted the practical difficulties and potential unfairness of such an interpretation, particularly in cases where the complainant was unaware of earlier infringements. He concluded that the view taken in the previous decision of Abdulsatarkhan v. Ratanlal was not supported by the language of the section.
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