2005 (2) TMI 890 - SC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:

1. Validity of the Respondent's appointment and termination.
2. Application of the principle of res judicata.
3. Consideration of the belated claim by the Respondent.

Detailed Analysis:

Validity of the Respondent's Appointment and Termination:

The Respondent was appointed as a Typist on an ad hoc basis for 89 days without any advertisement or notification to the Employment Exchange and did not possess the requisite qualifications initially. Her appointment was subject to the approval of the Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Haryana, who later relaxed the qualification requirements. The Respondent's appointment was extended periodically until 30.5.1986, after which her services were not continued, and no formal termination order was issued. The Respondent later joined Haryana Urban Development Authority (HUDA) on 10.8.1988. The Appellant-Bank argued that her entry into service was a back-door appointment, rendering it null and void, and her services automatically ended with the expiry of the contractual period.

Application of the Principle of Res Judicata:

The Respondent initially filed a writ petition in the High Court, which was withdrawn on 11.5.1993 to approach the Labour Court. The Labour Court dismissed her claim on the grounds of delay and res judicata, stating that her withdrawal of the writ petition without leave barred her from seeking relief in another forum. However, the Supreme Court opined that the Labour Court wrongly applied the principles of res judicata. The writ petition was not adjudicated on merits, and the Respondent was entitled to seek an alternative remedy. The principles of Order 23 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which lay down public policy, were deemed inapplicable in this context.

Consideration of the Belated Claim by the Respondent:

The Respondent issued a demand notice on 30.9.1993, seeking a reference of the industrial dispute by the State. The Labour Court dismissed her claim as belated, noting that she had been gainfully employed with HUDA since 10.8.1988. The Supreme Court highlighted that while the Industrial Disputes Act does not prescribe a limitation period, the courts have discretion in granting relief. The Court emphasized that the relief should be molded based on the facts and circumstances of each case. The decision in Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind Cooperative Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Limited was cited, but it was clarified that it did not establish a universal principle applicable to all cases. The Court noted that the Respondent's claim was stale, having approached the Labour Court after more than seven years, and her conduct in accepting alternative employment was a relevant factor.

Conclusion:

The Supreme Court concluded that the Labour Court's decision to refuse relief based on delay and the Respondent's acceptance of alternative employment was justified. The High Court's interference with the Labour Court's discretionary jurisdiction was deemed unwarranted. The appeal was allowed, setting aside the High Court's judgment, and no costs were awarded. The Court noted that the Respondent's service with the Appellant was ad hoc, and her reinstatement would not be equitable given her long-term employment with HUDA and the creation of third-party rights in the Appellant-Bank.