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Issues Involved
1. Whether an officer of the Railway Protection Force (RPF) making an inquiry under the Railway Property (Unlawful Possession) Act, 1966, is considered a police officer for the purposes of Section 25 of the Evidence Act and Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. 2. Whether a person arrested by an RPF officer under Section 6 of the Act for an alleged offence under Section 3 of the Act is a "person accused of an offence" within the meaning of Article 20(3) of the Constitution. 3. Whether Section 9 of the Act is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Detailed Analysis Issue 1: Status of RPF Officer as Police Officer The primary question was whether an RPF officer conducting an inquiry under the 1966 Act is a "police officer" for the purposes of Section 25 of the Evidence Act, which states, "No confession made to a police officer shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence." The Court discussed the policy behind Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act, which is to ensure that confessions made to police officers are presumed to be obtained under duress and are therefore inadmissible. The appellant's counsel argued that the term "police officer" should be construed broadly to include RPF officers, as they possess similar powers to those of police officers during investigations. However, the Court noted that the RPF officer does not have the power to submit a report or chargesheet under Section 173 of the Code, which is a significant distinction from police officers. The Court examined various precedents, including State of Punjab v. Barkat Ram, Badku Joti Savant v. State of Mysore, and State of U.P. v. Durga Prasad, which held that officers of other departments like Customs or Excise, who possess some powers of police officers, are not considered police officers under Section 25 of the Evidence Act. The Court concluded that an RPF officer does not possess all the attributes of a police officer, particularly the power to initiate prosecution by submitting a chargesheet under Section 173 of the Code. Therefore, an RPF officer is not a "police officer" within the meaning of Section 25 of the Evidence Act. Issue 2: Status of Arrested Person as "Person Accused of an Offence" The second issue was whether a person arrested by an RPF officer is a "person accused of an offence" under Article 20(3) of the Constitution, which protects against self-incrimination. The appellant argued that once a person is arrested under suspicion of an offence, they should be considered an accused person, and any statement made should be inadmissible. The Court referred to the interpretation of "person accused of any offence" in M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra, which requires a formal accusation through an FIR or a formal complaint. The Court noted that at the time the incriminating statements were made, no formal complaint or FIR had been lodged against the appellant. Therefore, the appellant was not a "person accused of an offence" within the meaning of Article 20(3) at that time. Issue 3: Constitutionality of Section 9 of the Act The third issue, regarding the constitutionality of Section 9 of the Act under Article 14 of the Constitution, was not raised or pressed during the arguments in the lower courts. Therefore, the Supreme Court refused to address this issue. Conclusion The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that: 1. An RPF officer is not a "police officer" within the meaning of Section 25 of the Evidence Act. 2. The appellant was not a "person accused of an offence" under Article 20(3) at the time the statements were made. 3. The issue of the constitutionality of Section 9 of the Act was not addressed as it was not raised in the lower courts. The Court also noted the State's undertaking to provide the accused with copies of all relevant documents and statements on which the prosecution intends to rely and permitted the accused to inspect other relevant materials collected by the inquiry officer. The case was sent back to the trial court for further proceedings with a directive to expedite the trial.
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