1963 (8) TMI 67 - SC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Scope and effect of Section 73 of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948.
2. Validity of the appellant's decision under Standing Order No. 8(ii).
3. Fairness of the appellant's rejection of the medical certificate.
4. Applicability of Section 73 of the Act to the case.
5. Judicial review of the Labour Court's decision.

Comprehensive, Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Scope and Effect of Section 73 of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948:
The principal question in this appeal concerns the true scope and effect of Section 73 of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948. Section 73(1) states that "No employer shall dismiss, discharge, or reduce or otherwise punish an employee during the period the employee is in receipt of sickness benefit or maternity benefit, nor shall he, except as provided under the regulations, dismiss, discharge or reduce or otherwise punish an employee during the period he is in receipt of disablement benefit for temporary disablement or is under medical treatment for sickness or is absent from work as a result of illness duly certified in accordance with the regulations to arise out of the pregnancy or confinement rendering the employee unfit for work." Sub-section (2) adds that "No notice of dismissal or discharge or reduction given to an employee during the period specified in sub-section (1) shall be valid or operative."

2. Validity of the Appellant's Decision Under Standing Order No. 8(ii):
Standing Order No. 8(ii) stipulates that "Any employee who absents himself for eight consecutive working days without Leave shall be deemed to have left the Company's service without notice thereby terminating his contract of service." It also provides that if the employee's explanation for the absence is satisfactory to the management, the absence will be converted into leave without pay or dearness allowance. The Labour Court found that the appellant was justified in acting upon the opinion given by its Medical Officer regarding the alleged illness of the respondent. The court stated, "The certified Standing Orders represent the relevant terms and conditions of service in a statutory form and they are binding on the parties at least as much, if not more, as private contracts embodying similar terms and conditions of service."

3. Fairness of the Appellant's Rejection of the Medical Certificate:
The High Court criticized the appellant's rejection of the medical certificate issued by the Civil Assistant Surgeon, Kanigiri, which stated that the respondent suffered from chronic malaria and dysentery from January 15 to March 7, 1957. The High Court found the appellant's Medical Officer's certificate vague and suggested that the appellant did not act fairly in rejecting the respondent's case. However, the Supreme Court noted, "The Labour Court has specifically repelled the criticism made by the respondent against the conduct of the appellant's Medical Officer and has held that if the matter had fallen to be considered only in the light of Standing Order 8(ii), the appellant would have succeeded."

4. Applicability of Section 73 of the Act to the Case:
The Labour Court ruled in favor of the respondent primarily on the ground that the appellant's decision not to reinstate the respondent was inconsistent with Section 73 of the Act. The High Court initially set aside this ruling but was later overturned by the Division Bench, which held that Section 73 applied to the present case, making the refusal to reinstate the respondent illegal. The Supreme Court noted that the liberal construction of Section 73 must flow from the words used in the section and that "if the words used in the section are reasonably capable of only one construction and are clearly intractable in regard to the construction for which Mr. Dolia contends, the doctrine of liberal construction can be of no assistance."

5. Judicial Review of the Labour Court's Decision:
The Supreme Court highlighted that the High Court, in exercising its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, should not have considered the propriety of the Labour Court's conclusions regarding the medical certificate. The Labour Court had already determined that the appellant was justified in its decision if considered solely under Standing Order 8(ii). The Supreme Court emphasized, "Whether or not the appellant should have accepted the certificate of the Civil Assistant Surgeon was primarily for the appellant to consider."

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court's judgment revolves around the interpretation and application of Section 73 of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948, and the validity of the appellant's actions under Standing Order No. 8(ii). The Court underscored the binding nature of certified Standing Orders and clarified the scope of judicial review in such matters, ultimately focusing on the statutory language and the specific terms agreed upon by the parties.