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Issues Involved:
1. Whether the High Court had the power under Section 561A, Criminal P.C. to quash all proceedings taken in pursuance of two first information reports. 2. Whether the offences reported were cognizable or non-cognizable. 3. The role and jurisdiction of the police in investigating cognizable offences. 4. The impact of previous civil proceedings on subsequent criminal investigations. 5. The inherent jurisdiction of the Court under Section 561A, Criminal P.C. 6. The necessity of government sanction under Section 197, Criminal P.C. for prosecuting a public servant. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. High Court's Power under Section 561A, Criminal P.C.: The primary issue was whether the High Court had the authority under Section 561A, Criminal P.C. to quash the proceedings based on two first information reports. The High Court decided to quash the proceedings, believing it was within their powers to prevent abuse of the process of the Court or to secure the ends of justice. However, their Lordships disagreed, stating that Section 561A does not grant new powers but preserves the inherent powers the Court already possesses. They emphasized that the judiciary should not interfere with police investigations, which are within the police's statutory rights under Sections 154 and 156, Criminal P.C. 2. Cognizable vs. Non-cognizable Offences: The reports filed on 31st August 1941 and 5th September 1941 were scrutinized to determine whether they described cognizable or non-cognizable offences. Their Lordships concluded that both reports charged the accused with cognizable offences under Section 409 and possibly Section 420, Penal Code. This distinction is crucial because cognizable offences allow the police to investigate without a Magistrate's order, while non-cognizable offences do not. 3. Police Jurisdiction in Investigating Cognizable Offences: Their Lordships underscored that the police have a statutory right to investigate cognizable offences without needing judicial authority, as provided in Sections 154 and 156, Criminal P.C. They stressed that the judiciary should not interfere with police duties unless necessary to prevent abuse of the process of the Court or to secure justice. The police's right to investigate is independent and should not be curtailed by the Court's inherent jurisdiction. 4. Impact of Previous Civil Proceedings: The High Court had quashed the investigation partly because similar charges against the respondent had been dismissed in previous civil proceedings. Their Lordships noted that findings in civil proceedings are not binding in subsequent criminal prosecutions. Therefore, the dismissal of charges in civil court does not preclude a criminal investigation based on the same or similar allegations. 5. Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court under Section 561A, Criminal P.C.: Their Lordships clarified that Section 561A does not confer new powers but ensures that the Court's inherent powers are preserved. The section was included to prevent the misconception that the Court's powers are limited to those explicitly stated in the Criminal Procedure Code. The Court's intervention should be limited to appropriate cases, and the police's statutory rights to investigate should be respected. 6. Government Sanction under Section 197, Criminal P.C.: The High Court had quashed the complaint filed by Mr. Gauba, citing Section 197, Criminal P.C., which requires government sanction to prosecute a public servant. Their Lordships agreed that no prosecution could proceed without this sanction. However, they differentiated between the stages of investigation and prosecution, stating that the investigation should be allowed to proceed until the stage requiring sanction is reached. Conclusion: Their Lordships advised that the appeal be allowed, the decree and order of the High Court quashed, and the police investigation permitted to proceed. They emphasized the importance of non-interference by the judiciary in the statutory duties of the police and the necessity of allowing investigations to proceed independently unless a clear abuse of the process of the Court is evident.
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