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Issues Involved:
1. Adultery 2. Cruelty 3. Revocation of Special Leave 4. Judicial Separation 5. Decree of Divorce Detailed Analysis: 1. Adultery The primary issue was whether the appellant had been living in adultery or had sexual intercourse with Chandra Prakash Srivastava after her marriage. The trial court held that the appellant was not living in adultery and that it was not proved beyond doubt that there was any sexual intercourse between the appellant and Chandra Prakash Srivastava. The High Court also found that it had not been proved that the appellant had been living in adultery within the meaning of s. 13(1)(i) of the Hindu Marriage Act. However, it relied on two letters alleged to have been written by Chandra Prakash Srivastava to the appellant to conclude that there had been sexual intercourse between them in 1955. The Supreme Court disagreed with this conclusion, stating that the letters did not necessarily prove any illicit relationship and accepted the appellant's denial of any sexual intercourse with Chandra Prakash. 2. Cruelty The second issue was whether the appellant had treated the first respondent with such cruelty as to bring the case within clause(b) of s. 10(1) of the Act. Both the trial court and the High Court agreed that there was no such cruelty that would bring the case within the meaning of s. 10(1)(b) of the Act. 3. Revocation of Special Leave The first respondent filed an application for revocation of special leave granted to the appellant, arguing that he had remarried and had a child based on the belief that the appellant had accepted the High Court's decree of divorce. The Supreme Court rejected this application, stating that it was not the appellant's duty to inform the first respondent of her intention to apply for special leave and that the first respondent took the risk of remarrying without ensuring that no further legal steps had been taken. 4. Judicial Separation The High Court had granted judicial separation under s. 10(1)(f) of the Act, based on the alleged sexual intercourse between the appellant and Chandra Prakash in 1955. The Supreme Court found that the letters relied upon by the High Court did not prove any illicit relationship and that the first respondent had continued to cohabit with the appellant even after knowing about the alleged adultery, which constituted condonation under s. 23(1)(b) of the Act. Therefore, the Supreme Court held that there was no ground for a decree of judicial separation. 5. Decree of Divorce The High Court had granted a decree of divorce using the U.P. amendment to s. 13(1)(viii), which allows for divorce if there has been no resumption of cohabitation after a decree for judicial separation and either a period of two years has elapsed or the case is one of exceptional hardship or depravity. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in granting a decree of divorce without first passing a decree of judicial separation. The Supreme Court also noted that even if there had been adultery, it had been condoned by the first respondent, and therefore, a decree of judicial separation or divorce could not be granted. Conclusion The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the High Court, and restored the trial court's decision rejecting the petition for dissolution of marriage or judicial separation. The appellant was awarded costs throughout from the first respondent. The appeal was allowed.
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