1962 (2) TMI 122 - SC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Construction of certain provisions of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
2. Whether the provisions in sub-clause (7) of Clause 9 of the Statutory Order are imperative or directory.
3. The validity of the Tribunal's award not being pronounced in open court.
4. Whether Clause 9(7) of the Statutory Order and Standing Order No. 36 are ultra vires the Act.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Construction of Certain Provisions of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947:
The appeals involve the interpretation of specific provisions of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, particularly concerning the requirement for the Tribunal to pronounce its award in open court. The Tribunal had submitted its award to the Government without pronouncing it in open court, which led to the High Court quashing the award.

2. Whether the Provisions in Sub-clause (7) of Clause 9 of the Statutory Order are Imperative or Directory:
The High Court held that the provisions in sub-clause (7) of Clause 9, which mandate that the Tribunal's decision shall be pronounced in open court, are imperative. The appellants argued that these provisions are merely directory, citing the rule of construction from Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, which suggests that prescriptions relating to the performance of a public duty are generally understood as directory. However, the Supreme Court found that this rule does not apply here, as holding the provision to be imperative would not cause serious hardship or injustice. Instead, it would ensure the proper functioning of the legislative intent.

3. The Validity of the Tribunal's Award Not Being Pronounced in Open Court:
The Supreme Court emphasized that procedural enactments regulating court proceedings are usually imperative. The court examined various provisions, including Section 6 of the Act, Clause 18, and Sub-clause (2) of Clause 24 of the Statutory Order, to determine the legislative intent. The court concluded that the requirement to pronounce the award in open court is essential to ensure transparency, allow for corrections of errors, and enable parties to exercise their right to appeal. The failure to pronounce the award in open court rendered the award a nullity.

4. Whether Clause 9(7) of the Statutory Order and Standing Order No. 36 are Ultra Vires the Act:
The appellants contended that Clause 9(7) of the Statutory Order and Standing Order No. 36 were ultra vires the Act, as Section 6 of the Act does not require the Tribunal to pronounce its decision in open court. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, stating that Section 6 merely directs the Tribunal to submit its award to the Government and does not address the manner of making the award. The court held that the provision for pronouncement in open court falls within the incidental or supplementary matters that the Government can regulate under Section 3(g) of the Act. Therefore, Clause 9(7) of the Statutory Order and Standing Order No. 36 are not in conflict with the Act and are valid.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, upholding the High Court's judgment that the Tribunal's failure to pronounce its award in open court rendered the award a nullity. The provisions requiring the pronouncement of the award in open court were held to be imperative and within the legislative power conferred by the Act. The appeals were dismissed with costs.