2017 (4) TMI 1478 - SC - Indian Laws

Restoration of possession of the disputed land - unreasonable delay in applying for restoration of the land - HELD THAT - There is inordinate, unexplained and unjustified delay on the part of the Appellants in firstly, making an application for restoration of land after a period of 24 years after such a right is said to have accrued to them and, then in making an application for restoration after a period of 16 years when the matter was dismissed in default. Where no period of limitation is prescribed, the action must be taken, whether suo motu or on the application of the parties, within a reasonable time. Undoubtedly, what is reasonable time would depend on the circumstances of each case and the purpose of the Statute. In the case before us, we are clear that the action is grossly delayed and taken beyond reasonable time, particularly, in view of the fact that the land was transferred several times during this period, obviously, in the faith that it is not encumbered by any rights. Merely because the legislation is beneficial and no limitation is prescribed, the rights acquired by persons cannot be ignored lightly and proceedings cannot be initiated after unreasonable delay - Appeal dismissed.

Summary

Issues:
1. Delay in applying for restoration of land under the Bihar Kosi Area (Restoration of Lands to Raiyats) Act, 1951.
2. Interpretation of "reasonable time" in the context of restoration of lands to farmers.
3. Power of Additional Collector to restore lands suo motu.
4. Effect of delay on rights acquired by individuals under beneficial legislation.

Analysis:

Issue 1: The primary issue in this case revolves around the unreasonable delay in applying for the restoration of disputed land under the Bihar Kosi Area (Restoration of Lands to Raiyats) Act, 1951. The Appellants failed to take any steps for restoration until 1975, a significant period after the Act was enacted in 1951. The delay was further exacerbated by subsequent dismissals and restoration of appeals, leading to a final application for restoration in 1999, after multiple legal proceedings spanning several decades. The Supreme Court emphasized the inordinate, unexplained, and unjustified delay on the part of the Appellants, ultimately leading to the dismissal of the appeal.

Issue 2: The Court delved into the interpretation of "reasonable time" concerning the restoration of lands to farmers under the Act. While the Appellants argued that the delay should be overlooked due to the beneficial nature of the legislation, the Court disagreed. Citing legal precedents and the purpose of the Statute, the Court highlighted the importance of initiating actions within a reasonable time to protect the rights and advantages of all parties involved. The Court rejected the argument that the absence of a prescribed limitation period allowed for indefinite delays in seeking restoration.

Issue 3: Another aspect addressed in the judgment was the power of the Additional Collector to restore lands suo motu. The Appellants contended that such power could be exercised at any time, even without a specified limitation period. However, the Court referred to a previous decision emphasizing that even in the absence of a prescribed limitation, actions must be taken within a reasonable time frame. The Court rejected the notion that the Additional Collector's power could be exercised arbitrarily after significant delays.

Issue 4: Lastly, the Court underscored the impact of unreasonable delays on the rights acquired by individuals under beneficial legislation. Despite the absence of a specific limitation period, the Court emphasized that rights acquired cannot be ignored lightly, and proceedings cannot be initiated after unreasonable delays. By dismissing the appeal, the Court reinforced the principle that even in the absence of a statutory limitation, actions must be taken promptly and within a reasonable timeframe to safeguard the interests of all parties involved.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court's judgment highlighted the significance of timely actions, the interpretation of "reasonable time," and the implications of unreasonable delays on rights acquired under beneficial legislation, ultimately leading to the dismissal of the appeal in this case.