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Issues Involved:
1. Applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to proceedings under Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act. 2. Nature of proceedings under Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act. 3. Interpretation of relevant sections of the SARFAESI Act, Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, and the Limitation Act. Detailed Analysis: 1. Applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to Proceedings under Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act: The core issue in this appeal was whether an application for condonation of delay in filing an application under Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act beyond the prescribed 45 days can be allowed by exercising power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Tribunal initially dismissed the application for condonation of delay, stating that Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to proceedings under Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act. The learned Single Judge, however, set aside this order, directing the Tribunal to dispose of the application for condonation of delay on its merits. The High Court, upon appeal, held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to proceedings under Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act. The Court reasoned that the provisions of the Limitation Act apply "as far as may be" to applications made to a Tribunal under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, but Section 5, which pertains to condonation of delay, does not apply to original proceedings like suits. The Court emphasized that Section 5 is not applicable to original proceedings, which include applications under Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act, as these are in the nature of original proceedings similar to suits. 2. Nature of Proceedings under Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act: The Court examined whether proceedings under Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act are appellate or original in nature. Referring to the Supreme Court decisions in Mardia Chemicals Ltd. v. Union of India and Transcore v. Union of India, the Court concluded that proceedings under Section 17(1) are original and not appellate. The Supreme Court had clarified that these proceedings are initial actions brought before a forum to challenge measures taken by a secured creditor, akin to filing a suit in a civil court. 3. Interpretation of Relevant Sections: The Court analyzed Sections 17, 35, 36, and 37 of the SARFAESI Act, Section 24 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, and Section 29 of the Limitation Act. The Court noted that Section 17(7) of the SARFAESI Act states that the Debts Recovery Tribunal shall dispose of applications in accordance with the provisions of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, and the rules made thereunder. Section 24 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, applies the provisions of the Limitation Act to applications made to a Tribunal "as far as may be." The Court concluded that while the Limitation Act applies to proceedings under Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act, Section 5 does not apply because the proceedings are original in nature, similar to suits. The Court also referred to the Supreme Court decision in Gopal Sardar v. Karuna Sardar, which held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to original proceedings initiated by applications, such as those under Section 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act. The High Court set aside the order of the learned Single Judge and reinstated the Tribunal's decision, holding that the Tribunal rightly refused to condone the delay in filing the application under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. Consequently, the writ application was dismissed. Conclusion: The High Court concluded that Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to proceedings under Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act, as these proceedings are original in nature, akin to suits. The Tribunal's decision to reject the application for condonation of delay was upheld, and the learned Single Judge's order was set aside. The writ application was dismissed, and the Court provided a stay of operation for four weeks to allow the writ petitioners to seek relief from a higher forum.
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