2019 (12) TMI 1293 - SC - Indian Laws

Condonation of delay of 916 days in filing appeal - the explanation for the delayed filing was not accepted and the Division Bench of the High Court on 29.10.2018 dismissed the LPA on the ground of delay without considering the merits of the appeal - Permission for the proposed construction of a group housing society on the land originally owned by the Ministry of Defence in the University enclave - whether violative of the MPD 2021 and is against the larger public interest - change in the character of the subject landis - restriction on certain developments for Metro Station prescribed under Master Plan of Delhi 2021. HELD THAT - The position is clear that, by and large, a liberal approach is to be taken in the matter of condonation of delay. The consideration for condonation of delay would not depend on the status of the party namely the Government or the public bodies so as to apply a different yardstick but the ultimate consideration should be to render even handed justice to the parties. Even in such case the condonation of long delay should not be automatic since the accrued right or the adverse consequence to the opposite party is also to be kept in perspective. In that background while considering condonation of delay, the routine explanation would not be enough but it should be in the nature of indicating sufficient cause to justify the delay which will depend on the backdrop of each case and will have to be weighed carefully by the Courts based on the fact situation - However, what cannot also be lost sight is that the consideration therein was in the background of dismissal of the application seeking condonation of delay in a case where there was delay of four days pitted against the consideration that was required to be made on merits regarding the upward revision of compensation amounting to 800 per cent. The entire explanation for the inordinate delay of 916 days is twofold, i.e. the non availability of the Vice Chancellor due to retirement and subsequent appointment of new Vice Chancellor, also that the matter was placed before the Executive Council and a decision was taken to file the appeal and the said process had caused the delay. The reasons as stated do not appear very convincing since the situation was of availing the appellate remedy and not the original proceedings requiring such deliberation when it was a mere continuation of the proceedings which had already been filed on behalf of the appellant herein, after due deliberation. In the present matter, the land was converted to residential use in 2005 and Respondent No.11 DMRC had invited bids and public auction was conducted on 28.07.2008 which ought to have awakened the appellant herein for the first time since the fact of conversion of the land into residential development was in public domain even if is assumed that the earlier process of approval etc. by the DDA on the approval request of DMRC are internal process and not be known to the appellant - Despite the writ petition having been filed belatedly in respect of certain actions which had commenced in the year 2005 and even though the writ petition was filed after obtaining approval of the Executive Council, no steps were taken to file the writ appeal for 916 days after disposal of the writ petition. In such circumstance, the cumulative effect of the delay and laches cannot be ignored. In the matter of condonation of delay and laches, the well accepted position is also that the accrued right of the opposite party cannot be lightly dealt with. In that regard, rather than taking note of the hardship that would be caused to the respondent No.13 as contended by the learned Senior Counsel, what is necessary to be taken note is the manner in which the respondent No.11 DMRC has proceeded in the matter - The respondent No.11 DMRC is engaged in providing the public transport and for the said purpose the Government through policy decision has granted approval to generate resources through property development and in that regard the development as earlier indicated, is taken up. Pursuant thereto the respondent No.11 has received a sum of ₹ 218.20 crores from respondent No.13 as far back as in the year 2008. The said amount as indicated is used for its projects providing metro rail service to the commuting public - In such circumstance, if at this stage the inordinate delay is condoned unmindful of the lackadaisical manner in which the appellant has proceeded in the matter, it would also be contrary to public interest. Thus, not only the learned Single Judge was justified in holding that the writ petition inter alia is hit by delay and laches but the decision of the Division Bench in dismissing the LPA on the ground of delay of 916 days is also justified - appeal dismissed.

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Delay in filing the appeal.
2. Legality of the construction permission granted to M/s Young Builders (P) Ltd.
3. Change in the character of the subject land.
4. Privacy and accessibility concerns related to the proposed construction site.
5. Public interest and policy considerations.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Delay in Filing the Appeal:
The appellant, University of Delhi, sought to challenge the High Court's refusal to condone a delay of 916 days in filing an appeal against a judgment dated 27.04.2015. The delay was attributed to various reasons, including the non-availability of the Vice-Chancellor and the need for deliberations by the Executive Council. The Supreme Court emphasized that the explanation for the delay must be reasonable and convincing. The Court found the reasons provided by the University unconvincing, noting that the Vice-Chancellor who was in office when the writ petition was filed remained in office for six months after its dismissal. The Court concluded that the delay demonstrated a casual approach and was not justified, thereby upholding the High Court's decision to dismiss the appeal on grounds of delay and laches.

2. Legality of the Construction Permission:
The University's writ petition challenged the Delhi Development Authority's (DDA) decision to allow M/s Young Builders (P) Ltd. to construct a high-rise building in the University campus without height restrictions. The Single Judge had dismissed the petition, noting that the DDA is the master of the Master Plan and necessary approvals had been obtained. The Court found no illegality or impropriety in the decision-making process and considered it a policy decision by a government body, which did not warrant judicial interference.

3. Change in the Character of the Subject Land:
The University argued that the land, originally acquired for public purposes (metro rail project), was being diverted to private commercial use, which was impermissible. The Single Judge observed that the change in land use from "public" to "residential" was permissible and had been approved by statutory authorities. The Supreme Court noted that such policy decisions, especially when approved by relevant authorities, should not be interfered with unless there is a clear demonstration of illegality or mala fide intent.

4. Privacy and Accessibility Concerns:
The University highlighted privacy concerns due to the proximity of the proposed construction to ladies’ hostels and the impact on accessibility for students and faculty. The Court acknowledged these concerns but noted that the Single Judge had already considered these issues and found no merit in them. The Supreme Court reiterated that such concerns, while important, must be balanced against the broader policy decisions and approvals granted by competent authorities.

5. Public Interest and Policy Considerations:
The University contended that the construction project was against the larger public interest and violated the Master Plan of Delhi (MPD-2021). The Single Judge had dismissed this argument, stating that the DDA had the authority to make such decisions and had followed due process. The Supreme Court emphasized that public interest arguments cannot override procedural delays and that the University's lack of diligence in pursuing the appeal undermined its case. The Court also noted that the DMRC's policy of generating revenue through property development was a legitimate public interest consideration.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision to dismiss the appeal due to the inordinate delay of 916 days, finding no sufficient cause for condonation. The Court also supported the lower court's findings on the merits, emphasizing the legitimacy of the policy decisions and approvals granted by the DDA and other authorities. The appeals were dismissed with no order as to costs.