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Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the plaint due to non-compliance with Section 51 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 2. Measure of damages applied by the lower courts. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Validity of the plaint due to non-compliance with Section 51 of the Code of Civil Procedure: The first objection raised by the appellant concerns the validity of the plaint, which was not signed in accordance with Section 51 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The appellant argued that this non-compliance rendered all proceedings in the suit void ab initio. The plaint was signed by an advocate of the High Court and by an individual named C.G. Sanders, who purported to sign as an "agent" for the plaintiffs. However, there was no power of attorney on record authorizing Sanders to sign the plaint on behalf of the plaintiffs, nor any evidence suggesting he was authorized under Section 51. Despite this, the Court noted that the defendant did not raise any objection regarding the authorization of Sanders until the second appeal. The suit was contested on merits, and the plaintiffs were represented by an advocate throughout the trial. Under Section 39 of the Code, an advocate does not require a document to represent a party. The Court presumed that the plaintiffs were represented with their knowledge and authority. The Court concluded that the defect in the plaint was waived by the defendant, and the suit could not be dismissed on this ground. The defect fell within Section 578 of the Code, which prohibits interference with decrees on the ground of any error, defect, or irregularity that does not affect the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court. The Court also referenced the judgment in Rajit Ram v. Katesar Nath, stating that even at this stage, it could direct the amendment of the plaint by adding the plaintiffs' signatures if necessary. However, the Court deemed such an amendment unnecessary. The Court disagreed with the appellant's argument that an unsigned plaint is "waste paper" and that there is no suit before the Court. Section 48 of the Code indicates that a suit is instituted by presenting a plaint, and Section 50 outlines the particulars a plaint must contain, without mentioning the necessity of a signature. Section 51, which deals with the signature and verification of the plaint, places both on the same footing. The Court emphasized that the absence of a signature does not render the plaint invalid or the suit non-existent. The Court cited several cases to support its view. In Mohini Mohan Das v. Bangsi Baddan Saha Das, the Privy Council held that the omission of a signature by one of the plaintiffs did not justify treating the suit as not instituted. The Court also referenced unreported cases where the plaint was returned for amendment due to unauthorized signatures, and the suits were not dismissed as waste paper. The Court rejected the argument that an unsigned plaint is necessarily waste paper and emphasized that dismissing a suit on such a technicality would sacrifice substantial justice for the sake of formality. 2. Measure of damages applied by the lower courts: The second objection raised by the appellant was that the lower courts applied a wrong principle as to the measure of damages. The damages claimed were the difference between the contract price of the goods, which the defendant refused to accept, and the price realized by the plaintiffs on resale. This claim was in accordance with a clause in the indent contract, similar to the clause considered by the Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Moll Schutte and Co. v. Luchmi Chand. The Court agreed with the decision in Moll Schutte and Co. v. Luchmi Chand and adopted the reasoning of the Chief Justice in that case. The Court held that Section 107 of the Contract Act was not applicable in this case, and the lower courts had correctly applied the measure of damages. The Court dismissed the appeal with costs. Separate Judgment by Knox, J.: Knox, J. concurred with the opinion that although the plaint was not signed by the plaintiffs as required by Section 51, the circumstances raised a proper presumption that the plaintiffs were privy to the suit throughout. He emphasized that the plaintiffs were represented by an advocate, and the prosecution of the suit by the advocate could be taken as an appearance by the plaintiffs themselves. Knox, J. referenced a previous decision in First Appeal No. 170 of 1895, where the absence of the plaintiffs' signatures was not considered a defect affecting the merits or jurisdiction of the Court. He disagreed with the authority in Marghub Ahmad v. Nihal Ahmad, which held that an unsigned plaint is waste paper, and reiterated his view that the plaint could be amended even at the appellate stage. Regarding the measure of damages, Knox, J. agreed with the decision in Moll Schutte and Co. v. Luchmi Chand and found no reason to interfere with the decrees of the lower courts.
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