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Issues involved:
The judgment deals with the issue of acquittal under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 based on the issuance of a cheque for a time-barred debt. Details of the judgment: 1. The accused was initially convicted but later acquitted under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The Complainant sought Special Leave to Appeal against this acquittal. 2. The ground of acquittal was that the cheque was issued for a time-barred debt, which was not enforceable under the explanation to Section 138 of the Act. The cheque was issued for part payment of commission or brokerage fees due since 30.12.1999. 3. The Addl. Sessions Judge, citing relevant cases, concluded that the mere issuance of a cheque for a time-barred debt does not constitute a promise to pay as required by the Contract Act. The judgment emphasized the need for a written promise to pay to start a fresh period of limitation. 4. The judgment referred to a case where the accused's acquittal was reversed because the Complainant accepted a cheque issued for a debt due in December 1996. 5. Another case was cited where the accused validated the cheque by extending the repayment date multiple times, constituting a fresh promise under Section 25 of the Contract Act. 6. Previous judicial opinions were highlighted, stating that Section 138 of the Act is attracted only when a cheque is issued for a legally enforceable debt. Issuing a cheque for a time-barred debt does not lead to conviction under Section 138. 7. The judgment reiterated the requirement of an express promise in writing for a fresh period of limitation under Section 25(3) of the Contract Act. An implied promise is not sufficient, and a distinction was made between an acknowledgment under the Limitation Act and a promise to pay under the Contract Act. 8. The Court, based on precedent, upheld the acquittal of the accused, following the view established in previous cases. Special Leave to Appeal was denied based on the existing legal position. 9. The application was dismissed, maintaining the acquittal of the accused in line with the legal principles discussed in the judgment.
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