2020 (8) TMI 841 - SC - Indian Laws

Condonation of delay of 45 days in filing application - interpretation of Section 173 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 - HELD THAT - Chapter XII of the Act is a beneficial legislation intended at protecting the rights of victims affected in road accidents. Moreover, the Act is a selfcontained code in itself which provides procedures for filing claims, for passing of award and for preferring an appeal. Even, the limitations for preferring the remedies are contained in the code itself. The interpretation of a beneficial legislation must be remedial and must be in furtherance with the purpose which the statute seeks to serve. The aforesaid view has been reiterated by this court on multiple occasions wherein this court has highlighted the importance acknowledging legislative intention while interpreting the provisions of the statute. Section 173 provides that, any person aggrieved by the award passed by the Tribunal may approach the High Court within ninety days. However, the second proviso states that the High Court may still entertain such appeal even after the expiry of ninety days, if the appellant satisfies the Court that there exists sufficient reason behind the delay - Ordinarily, the word may is not a word of compulsion. Justice G.P. Singh in Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 14th Edn.,page 519 It is an enabling word and it only confers capacity, power or authority and implies discretion. Undoubtedly, the statute has granted the Courts with discretionary powers to condone the delay, however at the same time it also places an obligation upon the party to justify that he was prevented from abiding by the same due to the existence of sufficient cause . Although there exists no strait jacket formula for the Courts to condone delay, but the Courts must not only take into consideration the entire facts and circumstances of case but also the conduct of the parties. The concept of reasonableness dictates that, the Courts even while taking a liberal approach must weigh in the rights and obligations of both the parties. When a right has accrued in favour of one party due to gross negligence and lackadaisical attitude of the other, this Court shall refrain from exercising the aforesaid discretionary relief. The delay of 45 days has been properly explained by the appellants, which was on account of illness of the wife of Appellant No.1. It was not appropriate on the part of the High Court to dismiss the appeal merely on the ground of delay of short duration, particularly in matters involving death in motor accident claims. Moreover, in the present case no mala fide can be imputable against the appellants for filing the appeal after the expiry of ninety days. Matter remanded for fresh consideration on merits - petition allowed by way of remand.

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Delay in filing the appeal.
2. Interpretation of "sufficient cause" under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.
3. Discretionary powers of the court in condoning delays.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Delay in filing the appeal:
The primary issue in this case was whether the High Court erred in dismissing the appellants' delay condonation application for a delay of 45 days in filing an appeal. The appellants had filed an appeal against the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal's award, which was delayed due to the illness of the wife of Appellant No.1. The High Court dismissed the appeal solely on the grounds of delay without considering the merits of the case.

2. Interpretation of "sufficient cause" under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988:
Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act allows an aggrieved person to appeal within ninety days from the date of the award by the Claims Tribunal. The second proviso to this section grants the High Court discretionary power to entertain appeals beyond the ninety-day period if "sufficient cause" for the delay is shown. The Supreme Court emphasized that the term "sufficient cause" must be interpreted liberally, especially in beneficial legislation like the Motor Vehicles Act, which aims to protect the rights of victims of road accidents. The Court referenced previous judgments, such as Bombay Anand Bhavan Restaurant v. Deputy Director, Employees State Insurance Corporation and Vimla Devi v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., to underline that strict compliance with procedural rules can be relaxed to ensure victims receive just compensation.

3. Discretionary powers of the court in condoning delays:
The Supreme Court noted that the word "may" in Section 173 indicates that the High Court has discretionary power to condone delays. This discretion must be exercised in a manner that aligns with the purpose of the legislation, which is to ensure substantive justice. The Court cited Official Liquidator v. Dharti Dhan (P.) Ltd. and other cases to explain that the scope of discretion conferred upon the court should be used to enforce the rights of victims and their dependents. The Court also highlighted that the concept of "sufficient cause" should be applied in a reasonable, pragmatic, practical, and liberal manner, as seen in Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom, Perinadu Village v. Bhargavi Amma and Balwant Singh (Dead) v. Jagdish Singh. The Court emphasized that while a liberal approach is necessary, the conduct of the parties and the reasonableness of the delay must also be considered.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court concluded that the High Court's strict approach in dismissing the appeal on the grounds of a short delay was hypertechnical and not sustainable in law. The delay of 45 days was adequately explained by the appellants, and there was no mala fide intention on their part. The appeal was allowed, the High Court's order was set aside, and the matter was remanded to the High Court for fresh consideration on merits. The Supreme Court requested the High Court to dispose of the case within six months, considering the appeal's pendency since 2014.