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2020 (3) TMI 1368 - SC - Indian LawsFiling of reply to the complaint within time limitation - Section 13(2) (a) of the Consumer Protection Act - mandatory or directory provisions - power of District Forum to extend the time for filing the response beyond the period of 15 days, in addition to 30 days - commencing point of limitation of 30 days. Whether the District Forum has power to extend the time for filing of response to the complaint beyond the period of 15 days, in addition to 30 days, as envisaged Under Section 13(2)(a) of the Consumer Protection Act? - HELD THAT - It is clear that as mentioned in the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Consumer Protection Act, the District Forum is to provide speedy disposal of consumer disputes. The same has been further reiterated by the legislature by insertion of Section 13(2)(c) and 13(3A) by Act 62 of 2002 - the maximum period of 45 days, as provided under the Consumer Protection Act, would not mean that the complainant has a right to always avail such maximum period of 45 days to file its response. Regulation 10 of the Consumer Protection Regulations, 2005 clearly provides that ordinarily such notice to the opposite party to file its response shall be issued for a period of 30 days, but the same can be even less than 30 days, depending upon the circumstances of each case. By specifically enacting a provision Under Sub-section (3) of Section 13, with a specific clarification that violation of the principles of natural justice shall not be called in question where the procedure prescribed Under Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act has been followed or complied with, the intention of the legislature is clear that mere denial of further extension of time for filing the response (by the opposite party) would not amount to denial or violation of the principles of natural justice. This provision of Section 13(3) reinforces the time limit specified in Section 13(2)(a) of the Act. The case of JJ. MERCHANT (DR.) ORS. VERSUS SHRINATH CHATURVEDI 2002 (8) TMI 835 - SUPREME COURT is one relating to the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, and has been decided by a Bench of three Judges of this Court. In this case it has been held that the time limit prescribed for filing the response to the complaint under the Consumer Protection Act, as provided Under Section 13(2)(a), is to be strictly adhered to, i.e. the same is mandatory, and not directory - no further reference was required to be made, but still we have proceeded to answer the question referred to this Constitution Bench and are of the considered opinion that the view expressed by this Court in the case of Dr. J.J. Merchant is the correct view. The District Forum has no power to extend the time for filing the response to the complaint beyond the period of 15 days in addition to 30 days as is envisaged Under Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act. What would be the commencing point of limitation of 30 days Under Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986? - HELD THAT - A conjoint reading of Clauses (a) and (b) of Sub-section (2) of Section 13 would make the position absolutely clear that the commencing point of limitation of 30 days, under the aforesaid provisions, would be from the date of receipt of notice accompanied by a copy of the complaint, and not merely receipt of the notice, as the response has to be given, within the stipulated time, to the averments made in the complaint and unless a copy of the complaint is served on the opposite party, he would not be in a position to furnish its reply. Thus, mere service of notice, without service of the copy of the complaint, would not suffice and cannot be the commencing point of 30 days under the aforesaid Section of the Act - It is clarified that the objection of not having received a copy of the complaint along with the notice should be raised on the first date itself and not thereafter, otherwise if permitted to be raised at any point later would defeat the very purpose of the Act, which is to provide simple and speedy redressal of consumer disputes. The commencing point of limitation of 30 days Under Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act would be from the date of receipt of the notice accompanied with the complaint by the opposite party, and not mere receipt of the notice of the complaint. Application disposed off.
Issues Involved:
1. Whether Section 13(2)(a) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, which provides for the Respondent/opposite party filing its response to the complaint within 30 days or such extended period, not exceeding 15 days, should be read as mandatory or directory. 2. What would be the commencing point of limitation of 30 days stipulated under Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. Detailed Analysis: Issue 1: Whether the District Forum has power to extend the time for filing of response to the complaint beyond the period of 15 days, in addition to 30 days, as envisaged Under Section 13(2)(a) of the Consumer Protection Act? Analysis: - Section 13(2)(a) Interpretation: The court analyzed Section 13(2)(a) of the Consumer Protection Act, which mandates that the opposite party must file its response within 30 days, with a possible extension of 15 days at the discretion of the District Forum. This provision is considered mandatory, not directory, as the legislature's intention was to ensure speedy disposal of consumer disputes. - Legislative Intent: The court emphasized the legislative intent behind the Consumer Protection Act, which is to provide expeditious and simple redressal of consumer disputes. The insertion of Section 13(2)(c) and 13(3A) by Act 62 of 2002 further reinforces this intent by limiting adjournments and emphasizing timely disposal of complaints. - Mandatory vs. Directory: The court noted that the use of prohibitive or negative language in a statute typically indicates a mandatory provision. The specific language in Section 13(2)(a) and the absence of any provision for further extension beyond 45 days (30 days plus 15 days) make it clear that the provision is mandatory. The court cited several precedents to support this interpretation, including Lachmi Narain v. Union of India and Fairgrowth Investments Ltd. v. Custodian. - Principles of Natural Justice: The court addressed the argument of natural justice by pointing out that Section 13(3) of the Act explicitly states that compliance with the procedures laid down in Sub-sections (1) and (2) cannot be challenged on the grounds of natural justice. This provision reinforces the mandatory nature of the time limits specified in Section 13(2)(a). - Equity Considerations: The court rejected the argument that hardship or inconvenience to the opposite party should allow for an extension of time beyond the statutory limit. It emphasized that equity cannot override clear statutory provisions and cited several cases, including Popat Bahiru Govardhane v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, to support this position. - Comparison with Civil Procedure Code: The court distinguished the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act from those of the Civil Procedure Code (Order VIII Rule 1), noting that the latter allows for judicial discretion in extending time limits, whereas the former does not. The court also noted that the consequences of non-compliance are explicitly provided in the Consumer Protection Act, unlike in the Civil Procedure Code. - Conclusion: The court concluded that the District Forum does not have the power to extend the time for filing a response beyond the additional 15 days allowed under Section 13(2)(a). This interpretation aligns with the legislative intent to ensure speedy resolution of consumer disputes. Issue 2: What would be the commencing point of limitation of 30 days Under Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986? Analysis: - Commencing Point of Limitation: The court examined whether the 30-day limitation period for filing a response begins from the date of receipt of the notice of the complaint or from the date of receipt of the notice accompanied by a copy of the complaint. - Statutory Provisions: The court analyzed Sub-sections (2)(a) and (2)(b) of Section 13, which specify that the opposite party must be given a copy of the complaint along with the notice. Regulation 10 of the Consumer Protection Regulations, 2005, also mandates that notices must be accompanied by copies of the complaint and other relevant documents. - Precedents and Analogies: The court referred to similar provisions in other statutes, such as the Code of Civil Procedure and the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, where the limitation period for filing a response or challenging an award begins only after the party receives a copy of the plaint or award. - Practical Considerations: The court emphasized that the opposite party needs a copy of the complaint to prepare an adequate response. Therefore, the limitation period should commence only after the opposite party receives both the notice and the complaint. - Conclusion: The court held that the 30-day limitation period for filing a response under Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act begins from the date of receipt of the notice accompanied by a copy of the complaint, not merely from the date of receipt of the notice. Final Judgment: - Prospective Operation: The judgment is to operate prospectively. - Answers to Referred Questions: 1. The District Forum has no power to extend the time for filing the response to the complaint beyond the period of 15 days in addition to 30 days as envisaged under Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act. 2. The commencing point of limitation of 30 days under Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act would be from the date of receipt of the notice accompanied with the complaint by the opposite party, and not mere receipt of the notice of the complaint.
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