9911796707
|
Home
Issues:
Registration of an award after a significant delay of almost 6 years, interpretation of Sections 23 and 25 of the Registration Act regarding the time limit for presenting documents for registration, validity of registration beyond the prescribed time limit, exclusion of time period due to court orders, applicability of Limitation Act provisions to matters governed by special laws, principles of law regarding impossibility to perform an act, and exclusion of time periods during which proceedings were stayed by court orders. Analysis: The judgment addresses the issue of registering an award after a prolonged delay of almost 6 years, contrary to the time limit prescribed under Sections 23 and 25 of the Registration Act. The court deliberates on whether the Registration Officer had the authority to admit the award for registration beyond the stipulated time frame. The petitioner contends that any registration beyond the specified period is void, citing precedents from the Rangoon and Punjab High Courts. However, the court notes conflicting decisions from the Calcutta High Court, including Motahar Ali and Aditya Kumar, which seemingly restrict the extension of time for registration beyond the statutory limit. The court examines the circumstances surrounding the delay in registration, considering a court order directing maintenance of status quo that restrained the parties from presenting the award for registration. It deliberates on whether the period during which the court order was in effect should be excluded from computing the registration time limit under Sections 23 and 25 of the Registration Act. The judgment emphasizes the applicability of general legal principles, such as "Lex Non Cogit Ad Impossibilia" and "Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit," to prevent injustice and miscarriage of justice. Furthermore, the court evaluates the applicability of the Limitation Act provisions to matters governed by special laws, emphasizing that the powers under Section 5 or 15 of the Limitation Act are exercisable by courts only, not Registration Officers. The judgment highlights the principle that periods stayed by court orders should be excluded in computing any period of limitation, as established by the Supreme Court in previous cases. Ultimately, the court concludes that even after excluding the period during which the court order was in operation, the registration of the award was invalid due to exceeding the prescribed time limit. Consequently, the court allows the petition, quashes the registration, and refrains from awarding costs. In a concurring opinion, the second judge agrees with the analysis and decision of the court regarding the invalidity of the registration of the award due to the delay in presentation beyond the statutory time limit.
|
