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Issues Involved:
1. Competence of a Judge to pass an order under Section 397(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure after delivering the judgment. 2. Competence of the High Court to direct concurrent running of sentences under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 3. Circumstances under which sentences on subsequent convictions should run concurrently with previous sentences. Detailed Analysis: 1. Competence of a Judge to Pass an Order Under Section 397(1) After Delivering Judgment: The judgment addresses whether a judge can pass an order under Section 397(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure after delivering the judgment. The court clarified that the legislative intent of Section 397(1) is to allow the court to direct that a subsequent sentence may run concurrently with the previous sentence at the time of recording the subsequent conviction. The general rule is that sentences run consecutively unless directed otherwise at the time of sentencing. Section 369 of the Code prohibits courts from altering or reviewing a judgment once signed, except to correct clerical errors. The court concluded that neither the trial court nor the appellate court could exercise the discretion under Section 397(1) after the judgment has been signed, as altering the sentence arrangement would amount to a review of the judgment. 2. Competence of the High Court to Direct Concurrent Running of Sentences Under Section 561-A: The court examined whether the High Court could use its inherent power under Section 561-A to direct that sentences on subsequent convictions run concurrently with previous sentences. Section 561-A does not confer new powers but safeguards existing inherent powers to do justice, prevent abuse of the court process, or give effect to any order under the Code. The court referenced the Full Bench decision in Mahesh v. State, which held that inherent power could be invoked only in exceptional cases not covered by specific provisions of the Code. The court concluded that the High Court could exercise its inherent power to direct concurrent sentences if it serves the purposes mentioned in Section 561-A, such as preventing abuse of the process or securing the ends of justice. 3. Circumstances for Concurrent Sentences on Subsequent Convictions: The court emphasized that discretion to make sentences run concurrently should be based on sound principles and not be exercised arbitrarily. Situations where separate trials are held for offenses that are inherently or intimately connected might justify concurrent sentences. For example, if a person misappropriates money in a series of connected transactions or is tried separately for related offenses, concurrent sentences might be appropriate. However, in the cases of Mulaim Singh and Sukh Ram, the court found no justification for concurrent sentences as the offenses were distinct and unconnected. The court noted that the applicants were hardened criminals and that concurrent sentences would not serve the ends of justice. Conclusion: The court dismissed the applications of Mulaim Singh and Sukh Ram, finding no justification for making their sentences run concurrently. The court reiterated that the inherent power under Section 561-A should be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional cases where it is necessary to do justice, prevent abuse of the court process, or give effect to an order under the Code. The applications did not meet these criteria, and the sentences were to run consecutively as per the general rule.
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