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Issues Involved:
1. Applicability of Section 6(2) of the Court-fees Act to High Courts. 2. Whether Section 4 of the Court-fees Act overrides Section 149 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) regarding extension of time for court-fee deficiency. 3. Interpretation of "in its discretion" in Section 149 of the CPC. 4. Consideration of poverty or inability to pay full court-fee as a ground for extending time under Section 149 of the CPC or Section 6(2) of the Court-fees Act. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Applicability of Section 6(2) of the Court-fees Act to High Courts: The court examined whether Section 6(2) of the Court-fees Act, which allows a court to receive a plaint or memorandum of appeal with insufficient court-fee and grant time to make up the deficiency, applies to High Courts. The court concluded that Section 6(2) does not apply to High Courts or Courts of Small Causes in the Presidency towns. The reasoning was based on the structure of the Act, where Section 6(1) applies to courts other than those mentioned in Sections 3 and 4 (High Courts and Small Cause Courts). The omission of any reference to Sections 3 and 4 in Section 6(2) indicates that it pertains only to courts covered under Section 6(1). 2. Whether Section 4 of the Court-fees Act overrides Section 149 of the CPC: The court analyzed whether Section 4 of the Court-fees Act, which mandates that no document shall be filed unless the proper court-fee is paid, overrides Section 149 of the CPC, which allows courts to extend time for making good the deficiency in court-fee. The court held that Section 149 of the CPC should be read as a proviso to Section 4 of the Court-fees Act to avoid contradiction. This interpretation means that while ordinarily a document insufficiently stamped is not to be received, the court has the discretion to allow time for making good the deficiency. 3. Interpretation of "in its discretion" in Section 149 of the CPC: The court discussed the interpretation of the phrase "in its discretion" in Section 149 of the CPC. It emphasized that this discretion must be a judicial discretion, exercised according to the rules of reason and justice, and not arbitrarily. The court noted that there is no uniform practice in the interpretation of this phrase in the court, with some judges interpreting it strictly and others liberally. The court concluded that no amount of liberal construction could make the discretion exercisable as a matter of course, as this would turn it into a right rather than a discretion. 4. Consideration of poverty or inability to pay full court-fee as a ground for extending time: The court addressed whether poverty or inability to pay full court-fee at the time of filing an appeal could be regarded as a sufficient ground for extending time under Section 149 of the CPC. The court held that this could be considered a sufficient ground in special circumstances but not otherwise. It cited precedents where inability to procure funds due to extraordinary circumstances, such as famine, was considered a valid reason for extension. However, mere inability to pay without additional compelling circumstances was not deemed sufficient. Conclusion: The court answered the referred questions as follows: 1. Section 4 of the Court-fees Act is not subject to, or controlled by, the provision of, and principles underlying, Section 6(2) of that Act. 2. The provisions of Section 4, Court-fees Act, do not override the provisions of Section 149, Civil P. C., regarding the power of the High Court to extend time for making good the deficiency in court-fee. 3. There is no long-standing practice of the Court regarding the liberal interpretation of "in its discretion" in Section 149, Civil P. C. 4. Poverty or inability to pay full court-fee at the time of filing an appeal can be regarded as a sufficient ground for the exercise of the discretion of the Court in special circumstances but not otherwise. Judges' Concurrence: All judges on the Bench concurred with the answers and the reasoning provided in the judgment.
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