2001 (1) TMI 1022 - SC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues:
1. Whether the Forest Department can be considered "an industry" under the Industrial Disputes Act.
2. Whether the termination of an employee without complying with Section 25F of the Act in the Forest Department would be valid.

Issue 1:
The appeal questioned if the Forest Department in Gujarat, where the respondent worked as a Clerk, qualifies as "an industry" under the Industrial Disputes Act. The respondent was appointed on a temporary basis due to unavailability of candidates following the Recruitment Rules. The single Judge and Division Bench of the High Court held the Forest Department could be considered an industry based on previous judgments. However, the State argued that the Department does not fall under the Act's purview. The Court emphasized that positive facts must establish an establishment as an industry, which the respondent failed to do. The Court concluded that the Forest Department did not meet the criteria to be classified as "an industry."

Issue 2:
The State contended that the termination of the respondent without complying with Section 25F of the Act was valid as the Forest Department was not an industry. The Court found errors in the judgments of the single Judge and Division Bench, stating that the previous judgments used as references did not apply to the current case. The Court highlighted the lack of assertion by the respondent regarding the nature of duties and the job's nature in the establishment. As a result, the Court overturned the judgments of the single Judge and Division Bench, dismissing the writ petition. The Court allowed the appeal, emphasizing that the case's basis was the Act's applicability, which was deemed erroneous in law.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the State of Gujarat, holding that the Forest Department did not qualify as "an industry" under the Industrial Disputes Act. The Court overturned the judgments of the single Judge and Division Bench, dismissing the writ petition. The appeal was allowed with no order as to costs, emphasizing the erroneous application of the Act in the case.