1976 (9) TMI 189 - HC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Applicability and interpretation of Section 25B of the Delhi Rent Control (Amendment) Act, 1976.
2. Conditions under which leave to contest an eviction petition should be granted.
3. Defenses available to tenants under Section 14(1)(e) and Section 14A of the Act.
4. Definition and implications of "dwelling-house" under Section 14A.
5. Scope of High Court's revisionary powers under Section 25B(8).

Detailed Analysis:

1. Applicability and Interpretation of Section 25B:
The judgment discusses the introduction of a summary procedure for eviction petitions under the Delhi Rent Control (Amendment) Act, 1976, specifically under Section 25B. This procedure applies to petitions for eviction on the grounds of bona fide personal necessity (Section 14(1)(e)) and under the newly inserted Section 14A. The amendments are intended to expedite eviction proceedings by prescribing a special form for summons and limiting the defenses a tenant can raise.

2. Conditions for Granting Leave to Contest:
The tenant must file an affidavit disclosing facts that would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an eviction order. The affidavit must be clear, specific, and positive. The Controller is to grant leave if the defense is bona fide and raises a real issue. If the defense is vague, mala fide, or intended to delay proceedings, leave may be refused. The judgment emphasizes that the Controller cannot determine disputed facts at the leave stage but must set the matter for trial if a bona fide dispute is raised.

3. Defenses Available to Tenants:
For petitions under Section 14(1)(e), tenants can challenge the landlord's ownership, the bona fide requirement of the premises, and the existence of alternative suitable accommodation. They can also raise procedural defenses such as the validity of the eviction notice or lack of permission from the Competent Authority (Slum Areas). However, for petitions under Section 14A, the defenses are limited to the specific conditions mentioned in Section 14A, such as whether the landlord owns more than one dwelling house.

4. Definition and Implications of "Dwelling-House":
The term "dwelling-house" is interpreted to mean a whole building intended to be used separately as one residential unit, rather than just a part of a building. The judgment clarifies that the landlord must specify all dwelling houses owned and indicate which one they seek to recover. The definition includes structures that are residential in nature, even if used incidentally for commercial purposes without the landlord's consent.

5. Scope of High Court's Revisionary Powers:
Under Section 25B(8), the High Court's revisionary powers are limited to ensuring that the Controller's order is according to law. The High Court cannot interfere with plain findings of fact unless there is a miscarriage of justice due to a legal error. The judgment references the Supreme Court's decision in Hari Shankar v. Rao Girdhari Lal Choudhry, which outlines the scope of revisionary jurisdiction.

Separate Judgments:

C.R. 369 of 1976:
The tenant's revision was allowed, and the Controller's order refusing leave to contest was set aside. The matter required evidence to determine whether the premises constituted one dwelling-house or separate houses.

C.R. 474 of 1976:
The tenant's revision was allowed, and the Additional Controller's order was set aside. The defenses raised by the tenant were deemed specific and bona fide, requiring a trial on merits.

C.R. 322 of 1976:
The tenant's revision was dismissed, and the Controller's order was affirmed. The defenses raised were found not bona fide and intended to delay proceedings.

C.R. 326 of 1976:
The tenant's revision was dismissed, and the Controller's order was affirmed. The defenses regarding the ownership and letting purpose were not bona fide, and procedural defenses were not applicable under Section 14A.

C.R. 349 of 1976:
The tenant's revision was dismissed, and the Controller's order was affirmed. The defenses regarding the letting purpose, notice of termination, and permission from the Competent Authority were not applicable under Section 14A.