1981 (1) TMI 295 - HC - Central Excise

Summary

Issues:
1. Prosecution beyond the period of limitation under Section 75 of the Punjab Excise Act and Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Analysis:
The case involved a challenge to the prosecution proceedings initiated against the Petitioners for the possession of illicit liquor beyond the period of limitation as prescribed under Section 75 of the Punjab Excise Act and Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Petitioners contended that the Magistrate had no power to take cognizance of the offence due to the delay in filing the challan. The Respondent, on the other hand, argued that special sanction from the State Government was obtained for prosecution after the limitation period had expired, thereby justifying the delay in filing the challan.

The Court examined the relevant provisions of the Excise Act and the Code of Criminal Procedure to determine the legality of the prosecution proceedings. Section 468 of the Code sets out the period of limitation for different categories of offences, with specific timelines based on the severity of punishment. Additionally, Section 470(3) of the Code provides for the exclusion of time taken to obtain consent or sanction in computing the period of limitation.

The Court emphasized the importance of harmonizing the provisions of the Excise Act and the Code of Criminal Procedure. It concluded that prosecution under the Excise Act must be initiated within one year, as specified in Section 75(2) of the Act. The Court clarified that even if Section 468 allows for a three-year limitation period for certain offences, the special sanction from the State Government is crucial for launching prosecution beyond the one-year limit prescribed by the Excise Act.

Since the provisions of Section 470(3) of the Code were not applicable in the present case, and the challan was filed well beyond the three-year period specified in Section 468, the Court held that the Magistrate lacked the authority to take cognizance of the offence. The Court highlighted that the power under Section 473 of the Code to extend the limitation period could only be exercised if the delay was properly explained or in the interest of justice, which was not the case here.

Consequently, the Court allowed the petition and quashed the proceedings against the Petitioners in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Kharar, as the prosecution was initiated beyond the statutory limitation period without proper justification or satisfaction of the Court.