2014 (11) TMI 1281 - HC - Companies Law

Prosecution is time barred or not - Violation of Section 100 of the Companies Act, 1956 - liability for punishment under Section 629(A) of the Companies Act - whether the prosecution in the instant case is barred by limitation under Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure? - HELD THAT - As per Section 470 of Cr.P.C., as stated in paragraph 6 of the counter, the period spent on stay order has to be excluded while computing the period of limitation. In this case, the stay was ordered on 23.10.2003 and it was vacated on 27.04.2005. This period has to be necessarily excluded while computing the period of limitation. But after 27.04.2005, the complaint was not filed within six months, the reason stated is that some time was taken to complete the investigation and to get permission from the Central Government. The consent or sanction as has been referred to in sub-clause 3 of Section 470 of Cr.P.C. relates to consent or sanction which is obtained under the Statute itself. Here in this case, to prosecute a person for offence punishable under Section 629(A) of the Companies Act, neither any consent nor any sanction from the Central Government is required. It may be true that on the administrative side permission is obtained from the Central Government to launch prosecution, but that permission cannot be equated to a consent or sanction to be obtained statutorily as referred to under sub-section 3 of Section 470 of the Cr.P.C. Therefore, this period cannot be excluded at all from the period of limitation. If it is done, obviously the complaint is barred by limitation because the complaint was not launched within six months atleast from 27.04.2005, the day when stay order was vacated. Admittedly the complaint was launched only in the year 2006, thus the prosecution is barred by limitation. Therefore, the proceedings is liable to be quashed. Petition allowed.

Summary

Issues:
Accused seeking to quash a case alleging violation of Companies Act, 1956. Focus on whether the prosecution is barred by limitation under Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Analysis:
The petitioners were accused in a case alleging violation of Section 100 of the Companies Act, 1956, seeking to quash the case on the grounds of limitation under Section 468 of the Cr.P.C. The learned counsel for the petitioners argued that since the maximum punishment under Section 629(A) of the Companies Act is a fine, the limitation period is six months from the date of the offense. The offense in question occurred in 2000-2002 but the complaint was filed in 2006, leading to the argument that the prosecution is time-barred.

The respondent countered by stating that investigation began in 2003, but due to legal proceedings including a stay order, the prosecution was delayed. The respondent argued that the period during which the investigation and obtaining permission from the Central Government took place should be excluded from the limitation period calculation, as per Section 470(3) of the Cr.P.C. The Central Government granted permission to prosecute in 2006, within six months of which the complaint was filed.

The court examined the provisions of Section 470(3) of the Cr.P.C. and concluded that the period excluded from limitation under this provision pertains to obtaining consent or sanction statutorily required for prosecution. In this case, administrative permission from the Central Government did not fall under this category. Therefore, the court held that the time taken for administrative processes cannot be excluded from the limitation period calculation. As the complaint was filed in 2006, well beyond six months from the relevant date, the court ruled that the prosecution was indeed time-barred and ordered the proceedings to be quashed.