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Issues Involved:
1. Constitutionality of the Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976 due to non-compliance with Article 31(3) of the Constitution. 2. Legislative competence and categorization of the 1976 Act under Entry 5 of List II or Entry 42 of List III. Detailed Analysis: 1. Constitutionality of the Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976: The primary issue was whether the Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976 (the 1976 Act) was void because it was not reserved for the President's consideration and did not receive his assent as required by Article 31(3) of the Constitution. The appellants argued that the 1976 Act was invalid from its inception because it did not comply with the mandatory provision of Article 31(3), which required the President's assent for laws concerning compulsory acquisition/requisition of property. The respondents contended that the 1976 Act, although not reserved for the President's consideration, fell within the ambit of Article 31(2A) and that non-compliance with Article 31(3) did not render the legislation void but merely postponed its implementation. They argued that once Article 31 was repealed, the need for the President's assent disappeared, making the legislation effective. The court analyzed the judgments in Bondu Ramaswamy v. Bangalore Development Authority and Ors., M.P.V. Sundararamier and Company v. The State of Andhra Pradesh, and other relevant precedents. It concluded that the procedural requirement of Article 31(3) did not create substantive rights and was merely procedural. Therefore, the 1976 Act could not be declared void solely on the ground of non-compliance with Article 31(3). The court held that the 1976 Act became effective upon the repeal of Article 31, and the challenge to its constitutionality was rightly negatived by the three-Judge Bench. 2. Legislative Competence and Categorization under Entry 5 of List II or Entry 42 of List III: The second issue was whether the 1976 Act was a law enacted under Entry 5 of List II (local government) or Entry 42 of List III (acquisition and requisitioning of property). The appellants argued that the power to legislate for acquisition of property is an independent and separate power exercisable only under Entry 42 of List III. The respondents maintained that the 1976 Act was enacted for the establishment of a Development Authority for the development of Bangalore and adjacent areas, with acquisition of land being ancillary to the main objective of development. They argued that the 1976 Act fell within the scope of Entry 5 of List II, which pertains to local government. The court referred to the judgment in Munithimmaiah v. State of Karnataka, which held that the 1976 Act was enacted with reference to Entry 5 of List II and not Entry 42 of List III. The court noted that the provisions relating to land acquisition in the 1976 Act were incidental to the main objective of development. The court also distinguished the case from Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills (P) Ltd. v. State of U.P., which dealt with the independent power of acquisition under Entry 42 of List III. The court concluded that the 1976 Act was a law enacted under Entry 5 of List II, and the provisions for land acquisition were incidental to its main objective of development. Therefore, the challenge to the legislative competence of the 1976 Act was rejected. Conclusion: The appeals were dismissed, and the court upheld the constitutionality and legislative competence of the Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976. The parties were left to bear their own costs.
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